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‘The office of the Speaker is one of great prestige and dignity… an 




The last decade of the twentieth century has been described by 
Huntington as the ‘Decade of Democracy.’2 During the early 1970’s the 
democratic archetype seemed to be more attractive than authoritarianism, 
roughly thirty countries shifted from the latter model to the former. The central 
theme in democracy involves the selection of leaders or top decision makers 
through a competitive election process.3 Legislatures are important cogs 
located within the democratic engine and according to Fish, ‘the presence of 
a powerful legislature is an unmixed blessing for democratization.’4 In the 
case of South Africa, the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 
(“the Constitution”) confers upon Parliament the legislative authority of the 
national sphere of government.5 
According to the Oxford Dictionary, the word ‘Parliament’ is defined (in 
the United Kingdom) as ‘the highest legislature, consisting of the Sovereign, 
the House of Lords, and the House of Commons.’ The Oxford dictionary goes 
on to provide that a ‘Parliament is a legislature similar to the United Kingdom 
Parliament in other nations and states.’6 Furthermore, the Oxford Dictionary 
states that the word ‘legislature’ means ‘the legislative body of a country or 
                                                          
1 Laundy P “The Office of Speaker in the Parliaments of the Commonwealth” 1984 at page 
66.  
2 Robinson WH “Parliamentary libraries and information services of Asia and the Pacific: 
papers prepared for the 62nd IFLA Conference, Beijing, China” 1997 cited in “Parliamentary 
information sources, systems and services in South Africa and the role of Parliamentary 
libraries in information provision” 2004 University of Zululand, South Africa at page 1. 
3 Huntington SP “The Third Wave Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century” 1991 
University of Oklahoma Press at page 6. 
4 Fish S “Stronger Legislatures, Stronger Democracies” 2006 Journal of Democracy, Volume 
17 at page 5. 
5 Section 43(a) of the Constitution.  
6 Concise Oxford Dictionary, 2015 Oxford University Press. 
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state’ and the same dictionary defines the word ‘legislative’ to mean ‘having 
the power to make laws.’7 Although there is a universally accepted definition 
of the word ‘Parliament’, there is no universally accepted parliamentary 
model as the role and functions of a particular institution are largely 
dependent on the historical circumstances of a particular State. Johnson 
acknowledges that academics are largely in agreement that Parliaments 
found in democratic states share three common functions: representation, 
lawmaking and oversight. 8 
Recently in South Africa, Parliament has been the recipient of 
extensive scrutiny. Some academics have gone as far as to say that 
Parliament is a ‘weak’ institution as a result of, inter alia executive 
domination, and a Speaker whose loyalties have been continuously 
questioned by opposition Members of Parliament. One of the main criticisms 
levelled against the Speaker relates to the fact that she does not encourage 
and facilitate debate in Parliament. The word ‘Parliament’ originates from the 
Latin word ‘parliamentum’ and the French word ‘parler’, which when 
translated into English, literally means ‘to talk’.9 Additionally, Loewenstein 
submits that, 
‘Parliament can be seen as a body with a limited number of members 
whose official function it is to 'represent' others who cannot, by reason 
of their numbers or geographical dispersal, attend themselves. This 
implies that the voices of all the people in a country will be heard 
through their respective representatives in Parliament.’10 
During the apartheid era the South African Parliament was weakened 
due to executive domination, and twenty one years into South Africa’s 
democracy Parliament is again beginning to show signs of executive 
domination. This is a matter of concern because Parliament is considered to 
                                                          
7 Concise Oxford Dictionary, 2015 Oxford University Press. 
8 Johnson JK “The Role of Parliament in Government” 2005 World Bank Institute, 
Washington D.C at page 2. 
9 Concise Oxford Dictionary, 2015 Oxford University Press.  
10 Loewenstein K “British cabinet government” 1967 London Oxford University Press as cited 
in “Parliamentary information sources, systems and services in South Africa and the role of 




be the bedrock of South Africa’s democratic dispensation and serves as the 
voice of the people. 
1.2 Transition to Democracy 
On 31 May 1910 South Africa became an autonomous State 
functioning within the British Commonwealth. The Union of South Africa, as it 
was termed, emerged as a result of the promulgation of the South Africa Act 
of 1909 (the Act) – the Act combined the Natal, Cape, Transvaal and the 
Orange Free State colonies to form the Union of South Africa. The newly 
adopted Act vested the legislative authority in the Union Parliament - which 
was bicameral and was located in Cape Town. The Union’s Parliament 
consisted of a House of Assembly and a Senate and Members of the House 
of Assembly were elected through a majoritarian electoral system, whilst 
Members of the Senate were elected using a system of proportional 
representation. An executive council existed within Parliament and it acted as 
the Cabinet. Its core function was to oversee day to day political activity in 
Parliament.11 
The House of Assembly was made up of Members who were directly 
elected by the voters. Voters in the Cape Province had to be male citizens 
who owned property worth 75 pounds, or who earned a salary of 50 pounds 
a year. Furthermore, in order to qualify as a voter a male needed to possess 
the ability to put his name, address and occupation in writing. Initially, there 
was no colour distinction in the Cape Province, thus Black and Coloured men 
were entitled to vote had they fulfilled the aforementioned requirements. 
However, the situation was vastly different in Natal, Transvaal and the 
Orange Free State. In order to vote in the latter provinces a person had to be 
male, white and 21 years of age. In Natal non-Whites were able to vote under 
certain conditions, however, according to Millin these conditions were ‘so 
onerous that a vote was about as accessible to him as a white skin itself.’12 
                                                          
11 Venter A “Historical overview: the development of modem South African 
Politics” 1989 South African government and politics: an introduction to its institutions, 
processes and policies. Johannesburg: Southern Book Publishers as cited in “Parliamentary 
information sources, systems and services in South Africa and the role of Parliamentary 
libraries in information provision” 2004 University of Zululand, South Africa at page 39. 




In 1930 White women were granted the right to vote when General 
Hertzog introduced the Women’s Enfranchisement Act.13 A year later a Bill 
was introduced which brought an end to the distinction between European 
voters in all of the provinces- this meant that there was no longer any 
qualifying factors in the Cape Province. Thus, White people in South Africa 
were completely enfranchised whilst the other races were not. The 
abovementioned requirements (sex, education and wealth) still applied to 
non-White voters in the Cape Province. 
In 1936 the Representation of Natives Act14 (“the Act”) was adopted 
by Parliament. The Act removed Black African men from the common voters’ 
roll in the Cape and placed them on a communal voters’ roll which entitled 
Black males in the Cape to elect three White representatives in three 
legislative divisions in the House of Assembly.15 In 1956 the National Party 
government adopted the South Africa Act Amendment Act16 which removed 
Coloured males from the common voter rolls in the Cape and placed them on 
a separate voters’ roll, thus allowing them to vote for four White 
representatives in the House of Assembly.17 In June 1960 Parliament 
adopted the Promotion of Bantu Self-governing Act18 which repealed the 
Representation of Natives Act, therefore bringing an end to all Black African 
representation in Parliament.19 Furthermore, in 1968 Coloured voters in the 
Cape had their voting rights revoked when the Separate Representation of 
Voters Amendment Act20 was adopted together with the Coloured Persons 
Representative Council Amendment Act21. The former Act abolished 
Coloured representation in the South African Parliament, whilst the latter 
established a Coloured Persons Representative Council. The Council had 
the authority to legislate on behalf of Coloured people in certain areas. 
                                                          
13 Hahlo and Khan “The Union of South Africa: The Development of its Laws and 
Constitution” 1960 at page 165.  
14 The Representation of Natives Act 12 of 1936. 
15 Op. cit. note 13 at page 165. 
16 South Africa Act Amendment Act 9 of 1956. 
17 Op. cit. note 13 at page 166.  
18 Promotion of Bantu Self-governing Act 46 of 1959. 
19 Op. cit. note 13 at page 165. 
20 The Separate Representation of Voters Amendment Act 50 of 1968. 
21 The Coloured Persons Representative Council Amendment Act 52 of 1968. 
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In May 1961 South Africa was expelled from the Commonwealth and 
subsequently became a Republic with its own Constitution22. The legislative 
function of the Republic of South Africa vested in Parliament which consisted 
of the House of Assembly and the Senate. The Republic of South Africa 
consisted of 165 constituencies, and therefore representation within the 
House of Assembly was made up of 165 constituent representatives, who 
were elected by White voters. The executive function vested with the State 
President and the Members who were appointed to his Cabinet. The Prime 
Minister was appointed by the State President.  Toward the end of the 
apartheid regime, the Republic of South Africa began to descend into political 
turmoil and according to Mostert, ‘the executive usurped the political role of 
Parliament, diminishing it to a policy-legitimising body, rather than a policy 
leadership body.’23 
In 1978 P. W Botha became the political leader of the Republic of 
South Africa. Botha initially served as the Prime Minister from 1978 to 1984, 
and thereafter was appointed as the State President from 1984 to 1989. 
During his term in office, State President Botha established a super 
committee within the Cabinet known as the State Security Council (“SSC”). 
According to Stott, the SSC assumed the position of the ‘de facto Cabinet’ 
thereby taking on a pivotal policy formulation role.24 Often the SSC would 
make important decisions vis-à-vis South Africa, thus frequently exceeding 
the Cabinet as the most important decision making body in the country. 
During this period in the evolution of the South African legislature, the House 
of Assembly was an engine used by the executive to merely rubberstamp its 
policy directives. 
In 1980 the Senate was formally abolished and was subsequently 
replaced with the President’s Council which consisted of White, Chinese, 
                                                          
22 The Republic of South Africa Constitution Act of 1961. 
23 Mostert BJ “Parliamentary information sources, systems and services in South Africa and 
the role of Parliamentary libraries in information provision” 2004 University of Zululand, 
South Africa at page 45. 
24 Stott N “From the SADF to the SANDF: Safeguarding South Africa for a better life for all?” 
2002 Violence and Transition Series, Vol. 7 page number not available.   
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Coloured and Indian representatives.25 The President’s Council fulfilled an 
advisory role by advising the two other governmental institutions on matters 
relating to non-White persons.26 In 1983, on the recommendation of the 
President’s Council, the majority of Parliament adopted a new Constitution27 
which split Parliament into three different Houses: the Assembly, the House 
of Representatives and the House of Delegates. The Assembly consisted of 
White delegates, the House of Representatives of Coloured delegates, and 
the House of Delegates was made up of Indian representatives.28  However, 
Black Africans remained disenfranchised and thus any form of representation 
of their people in the newly formed tricameral Parliament was prohibited. 
In 1990 history was made when President F.W de Klerk announced 
that Nelson Mandela was to be released from Prison and that the African 
National Congress (“ANC”) was to be un-banned. Furthermore, State 
President de Klerk announced that South Africa would begin the transition 
from parliamentary sovereignty into a state based on democracy. There 
would be a two-stage process of constitutional reform - the first stage of the 
process entailed negotiations as to what regime South Africa would follow, 
and remained under the control of the ANC and the National Party. The 
second stage would then be directed by the 34 Constitutional Principles 
decided upon through the Multi-party Negotiating Process. These principles 
were then used by an elected Constitutional Assembly and the Senate of the 
first democratic Parliament to draft a final Constitution. 
During the initial stages of the negotiations the ANC made use of a 
document known as the Harare Declaration – a document requiring the 
apartheid government to fulfil certain conditions, one of which being the 
dissolution of all legislation which had been promulgated to limit political 
                                                          
25Mostert BJ “Parliamentary information sources, systems and services in South Africa and 
the role of Parliamentary libraries in information provision” 2004 University of Zululand, 
South Africa at page 44. 
26 Marais D “South Africa: constitutional development: a multi-disciplinary approach” 1989 
Johannesburg Southern Book Publishers as cited in “Parliamentary information sources, 
systems and services in South Africa and the role of Parliamentary libraries in information 
provision” 2004 University of Zululand, South Africa at page 44. 
27 Republic of South Africa Constitution Act 110 of 1983. 
28 Olivier NJJ “Race Discrimination in South Africa: An Overview” 1989 Department of 
Roman law and Legal Pluralism, Potchefstroom University at page 310. 
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activity.29 Toward the end of 1990 there were increased levels of violence 
between government armed forces and people living in the townships as well 
as residents living in the mining hostels. According to Klug the ANC did not 
want to make the end to violence a precondition for negotiations to continue, 
as the party leaders felt that it would place the apartheid government in a 
position to control future negotiations.30 Therefore in order to ensure that 
South Africa transitioned smoothly to democracy, the ANC created a number 
of preconditions and advanced its own plan for the transition to a new order. 
The party called for, inter alia a multi-party negotiation conference, the 
creation of an interim government, and elections for a constituent Assembly 
to create a new official Constitution.31 
In 1991 the Convention for a Democratic South Africa (“CODESA”) 
was established and the major parties came to an agreement on certain 
fundamental points. The parties agreed that South Africa would become a 
multi-party democracy with a Bill of Rights, and any rights disputes would be 
decided upon by a Constitutional Court.  In 1993 South Africa adopted an 
Interim Constitution which came into force with the first democratic election in 
April 1994. The Interim Constitution contained 34 Constitutional Principles 
agreed upon through the process referred to previously. Furthermore, the 
Interim Constitution made provision for the creation of a final Constitution 
within two years of the first sitting of the National Assembly. It was agreed by 
the negotiating parties that the final Constitution had to be adopted by at 
least two-thirds of the Constitutional Assembly before it could be submitted to 
the Constitutional Court for final certification. The Constitutional Court 
needed to ensure that the final Constitution conformed to the 34 
Constitutional Principles before certifying the text. Initially the Constitutional 
Court refused to certify the Constitution in its first certification judgment, 
however, it approved and certified the final text in the second certification 
judgment. The effect of which saw South Africa adopt a new Constitution 
which came into force on 4 February 1997. 
                                                          
29 Klug H “Constitution –making, Democracy and the ‘Civilizing ‘of Irreconcilable Conflict 
What Might We Learn from the South African Miracle?” 2007 Wisconsin International Law 
Journal Vol. 25, No. 2 pp 272 - 299 at page 272. 
30 Ibid. at page 273. 
31 Ibid. at page 273. 
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1.3 The Legislature in terms of the Constitution 
Constitutional Principle VI, as contained in the Interim Constitution, 
established a uniquely South African separation of powers doctrine. The 
doctrine required a separation between the legislature, executive and the 
judiciary with appropriate checks and balances to ensure accountability, 
responsiveness and openness.32 The main objective for the incorporation of 
the doctrine was to safeguard against the over-allocation of power to one 
branch of government. Under the Constitution, the South African government 
is made up of three branches of government which are all mutually 
supportive of one and the other.33 In Doctors for Life International v Speaker 
of the National Assembly34 Ngcobo J reiterated this point by stating: 
‘In the overall scheme of our Constitution, the representative and 
participatory elements of our democracy should not be seen as being 
in tension with each other. They must be seen as mutually 
supportive...’35 
The adoption of the final Constitution reaffirmed the status quo by 
providing for three distinct branches of government: a legislative authority 
(Chapter 4), an executive authority (Chapter 5) and a judicial authority 
(Chapter 8). The national legislative authority is vested in Parliament36; the 
executive authority is vested in the President37 ; and the judicial authority is 
vested in the courts.38 
The Constitution provides that Parliament consists of the National 
Assembly (“NA”) and the National Council of Provinces (“NCOP”). The NA 
comprises 400 Members that are elected to serve a five year term. Members 
are elected under a closed list proportional representation electoral system. 
The NCOP consists of a single delegation from each province, each 
                                                          
32 Constitutional Principle VI as contained in the Interim Constitution of the Republic of South 
Africa Act 200 of 1993. 
33 MJ Kock “The impact of political steering on the legislative process” 2013 LLM 
Dissertation, University of Pretoria at page 5. 
34 Doctors for Life International v Speaker of the National Assembly 2006 (12) BCLR 1399 
(CC). 
35 Ngcobo J, supra at para 115. 
36 Section 43 (a) of the Constitution.  
37 Section 85 (1) of the Constitution. 
38 Section 165 of the Constitution. 
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consisting of ten delegates.39 The NCOP is made up of four special 
delegates and six permanent delegates.40 
The Constitution confers upon the NA the legislative authority to 
‘consider, pass, amend or reject any legislation before the Assembly; and 
initiate or prepare legislation, except money Bills.’41 In addition to its 
legislative function, the NA is obliged to, 
‘Provide for mechanisms - to ensure that all executive organs of state 
in the national sphere of government are accountable to it; and to 
maintain oversight of - the exercise of national executive authority, 
including the implementation of legislation; and any organ of state.’42 
Further to the abovementioned, the Constitution makes provision for the 
powers of the NCOP. The text states that, 
‘In exercising its legislative power, the National Council of Provinces 
may - consider, pass, amend, propose amendments to or reject any 
legislation before the Council…; and initiate or prepare legislation 
falling within a functional area listed in schedule 4 or other legislation 
referred to in section 76(3), but may not initiate or prepare money 
Bills.’43 
In accordance with South Africa’s constitutional frame-work, 
Parliament fulfils a dual purpose by passing legislation and providing a 
national forum for public deliberation on matters of national importance.44 In 
Doctors for Life International Ngcobo J emphasized the importance of 
Parliament’s deliberative role by explaining that, 
‘A vibrant democracy has a qualitative and not just a quantitative 
dimension. Dialogue and deliberation go hand in hand. This is part of 
                                                          
39 Section 60 (1) of the Constitution. 
40 Section 60(2) of the Constitution. 
41 Section 55 (1) of the Constitution. 
42 Section 55(2) of the Constitution. 
43 Section 68 of the Constitution. 
44 Primedia Broadcasting, A Division of Primedia (Pty) Ltd and Others v Speaker of the 
National Assembly and Others (2015) ZAWCHC 72. 
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the tolerance and civility that characterise the respect for diversity the 
Constitution demands…’45 
The South African Parliament is largely based on the Westminster 
model of Parliament with the Speaker of Parliament located at the head of 
the chamber. A Mace is located in front of the Speaker as a symbol of 
authority, and the Sergeant-at-arms is present to maintain order and when 
addressing each other in Parliament, Members are required to refer to each 
other as ‘the Honourable Member’. The ruling party is seated on the right of 
the Speaker and the opposition parties are located on the left. 
1.4 Evolution of the Speakership 
In South Africa, the leader of the National Assembly is the Speaker of 
said office and the leader of the NCOP is referred to as the Chairperson. 
Further reference to the NCOP however will not be made throughout the 
remainder of this paper, as this is not the focus. The paper will primarily focus 
its attention on the NA and the office of the Speaker to allow for a more 
concise investigation into the actual underlying focus of the paper itself – the 
office of the Speaker. As the leader of the National Assembly, the Speaker is 
to provide leadership and guidance to the Members of the House. For further 
purposes of this paper, the paragraphs to follow will analyse the evolution of 
the office of the Speaker in the United Kingdom. As previously mentioned, 
South Africa’s parliamentary system has its historical roots in the 
Westminster system, and therefore the roles and functions of the 
Speakership have to a large extent been inherited from the United Kingdom. 
It is therefore imperative to analyse the evolution of the office of the Speaker 
in the House of Commons, so as to gain a better understanding of the South 
African model. 
The office of the Speaker is somewhat as old as Parliament itself, with 
the first Speaker being selected by the House of Commons (“the House”) in 
1376. The Speaker’s function in the early stages of its inception was not to 
preside over parliamentary debate but rather to listen in on the debates 
taking place between Members of the House, in order to gather the agreed 
                                                          
45 Ngcobo J supra at para 234. 
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views of the majority on a matter and then relay the views to the King.46 
Additionally, the Speaker’s job was to communicate any decisions taken by 
the King on any matter back to the House of Commons.47 
At this point in the history of the Speakership, candidates were 
nominated by the King, thus the perception at the time was that the Speaker 
was indeed a servant of the Monarch. In 1413 however, the House of 
Commons rejected a candidate who had been nominated by the Monarch, as 
the candidate had presented a petition to the King without first gathering the 
views of the House on a particular matter. This was the first documented 
occasion of the House rejecting a candidate and then replacing him with a 
more acceptable candidate.48 The reaction of the House signified that 
although the royal Court was extremely powerful at the time, the Commons 
had the power to reject a candidate and replace him with someone more 
favourable. 
In 1642 the House of Commons and the Monarch were caught up in a 
bitter power struggle. The King at the time was of the opinion that he was 
able to pass any law of the land as a result of his divine right to rule. In an 
attempt to assert his dominance, the King did the unthinkable and entered 
into the House of Commons to order the arrest of five Members who had 
allegedly opposed his rule. The King turned to William Lenthall, who was the 
Speaker at the time, and asked him to point out the five Members. Lenthall 
respectfully declined to do so by replying: 
‘May it please Your Majesty, I have neither eyes to see, nor tongue to 
speak in this place, but as the House is pleased to direct me, whose 
servant I am here; and I humbly beg Your Majesty's pardon that I 
cannot give any other answer than this to what Your Majesty is 
pleased to demand of me.’49 
This historical event signified the distancing of the Speaker itself from the 
Monarch and was beginning to show signs of independence and 
                                                          
46 Laundy P “The Office of Speaker in the Parliaments of the Commonwealth” 1984 at page 
11. 
47 Ibid. at page 15.  
48 Ibid. at page 18. 
49 Ibid. at page 34. 
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impartiality.50 By 1658 the Clerk and the Mace were introduced into 
Parliament. The Clerk presided over proceedings before the Speaker was 
present and once the Speaker occupied the Chair, the Mace was brought in 
to the House to indicate that the power had now shifted from the Clerk to the 
Speaker.51 
The appointment of Richard Onslow as Speaker in 1566 was 
significant for the reason that his nomination was the first to be contested on 
record. It had emerged that Onslow had previously held office as a Solicitor- 
General and Members of the House believed that his political ties may have 
had a negative impact on his role as the Speaker. Onslow however emerged 
victorious by capturing 82 votes to his opponent’s 70. Although Onslow had 
emerged victorious, the call for an election signified a growing belief amongst 
Members that it was in the best interests of the House to nominate a 
candidate who was less likely to have his loyalties questioned.52 
In 1661 a gentleman by the name of Edward Seymour was selected 
as the Speaker of the House. Soon after his appointment as Speaker, 
Seymour was further appointed as a Privy Councillor. His appointment gave 
rise to a debate amongst the Members, who argued that the appointment 
created a conflict of interest. Laundy argues that this debate provides 
evidence of what he terms, ‘the growth of a new parliamentary outlook’ as a 
result of Members agreeing that the Speaker had to be independent of the 
Court in order to carry out his duties successfully.53 
In 1679 a Welsh Member of the House, William Williams, was elected 
to serve as the Speaker. The election of Williams as Speaker was a 
significant moment in the evolution of the office as according to Laundy, 
Williams was not nominated by the royal Court and evidence suggests that 
he was a radical person who was not afraid to publically criticise the 
                                                          
50 Seedat et al “The South African Parliament in 2015” 2015 Council for the Advancement of 
the South African Constitution at page 28. 
51 Commons Journal, Vol. VII at page 594 cited in “The Office of Speaker in the Parliaments 
of the Commonwealth” 1984 at page 36.  
52 Laundy P “The Office of Speaker in the Parliaments of the Commonwealth” 1984 at page 
25. 
53 Ibid. at page 38. 
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Monarch.54 The election of Williams signified that an isolation between the 
office of the Speaker and the Court had become tradition, and it was no 
longer customary for the monarch to nominate a representative. A candidate 
was now nominated by his Party in the House. Laundy submits that an 
incumbent was expected to retain his partisan ties in order to ‘advance the 
interests of the party to which he owed his appointment.’55 
The isolation of the Speakership from the royal Court strengthened the 
independence of Parliament, however, the isolation came at the expense of 
placing the Speakership in the hands of political parties more concerned with 
forwarding their own personal interests rather than maintaining the 
independence and impartiality of the office. The election of Arthur Onslow in 
1728, who was dubbed as one of the greatest Speakers of all time, was a 
significant moment in the evolutionary journey and came about at arguably 
the perfect time. Onslow was the first Speaker to fully appreciate the 
importance of having an independent office holder and he used his 
appointment to restore some credibility to the office by placing great 
emphasis on the importance of having an independent and impartial 
incumbent. Laundy submits that it was Onslow who was responsible for 
ensuring that the Speaker relinquished partisan ties in order to maintain a 
high level of impartiality whilst in office.56 
Finally by the 19th century, the office of the Speaker began to emerge 
as a completely independent office and it was becoming the norm for a 
candidate to resign from any ministerial office he may have occupied prior to 
his election.57 
In August 1841, a Liberal Speaker by the name of Charles Shaw-
Lefevre was elected to office. Like Arthur Onslow, Shaw-Lefevre appreciated 
the importance of setting a high standard of impartiality by removing himself 
from any political events.58 Laundy goes as far as stating that Shaw-Lefevre 
                                                          
54 Ibid at page 39. 
55 Ibid at page 40. 
56 Ibid at page 42.  
57 Ibid at page 45. 
58 Ibid at page 50. 
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‘was the first embodiment of the politically independent Speaker.’59 It was at 
this time in the evolutionary process that it became customary for a Speaker 
to display a high level of independence and impartiality whilst holding office. 
The evolution of the Speaker of the House of Commons in the United 
Kingdom has given rise to a robust set of traditions vis-à-vis the Speakership. 
Upon evaluating the evolutionary process two findings have become 
apparent. Firstly according to tradition, an office holder is required to display 
a high level of impartiality and independence to not only effectively fulfil the 
role and function as the leader of Parliament, but also to protect the sanctity 
of the institution. Secondly, it is apparent that the office of the Speaker in 
South Africa has adopted a substantial number of customs and processes 
associated with the Speakership of the House of Commons. It is therefore 
fitting that one assesses the South African system by studying it in 
conjunction with the Westminster model. 
1.5 The Intention of the Paper 
The main intention of this paper is to ascertain whether the 
Speakership and Parliament are involved in a symbiotic relationship. This 
paper will assess whether a weak incumbent will have an adverse effect on 
the NA thereby weakening the capacity of the NA itself. The word ‘symbiosis’ 
is of Greek origin and Latin descent and when defined means, ‘a mutually 
beneficial relationship between different people or groups.’60  In the Chapter 
to follow it is my intention to investigate the duties and functions of the 
Speaker by assessing the NA’s standing orders, traditions, as well as any 
relevant sources such as case law and academic writings. In Chapter Three I 
will reveal a number of criticisms regarding the office of the Speaker. In so 
doing, I will assess whether South Africa’s dominant party democracy has 
had a hand in negatively impacting the office. Furthermore, I will investigate 
whether the Speaker has indeed carried out the duties of the office in an 
impartial and fair manner. In Chapter Four I will investigate ways in which 
foreign legislatures have attempted to strengthen and enhance the 
independence and the functioning of the office. I intend to propose a range of 
                                                          
59 Ibid at page 50. 
60 Concise Oxford Dictionary, 2015 Oxford University Press. 
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possible solutions which I will argue could potentially strengthen and 
enhance the independence of the South African Speakership and thereby 



























CHAPTER TWO  
The South African Constitutional and Legislative Framework 
2.1 Introduction  
The South African Constitution contains a provision concerning the 
Speaker and the Deputy Speaker of the NA.61 Although no details as to the 
powers and functions of the Speaker and Deputy Speaker are provided, it 
does contain information relating to the election and removal of an office 
holder. According to Bergougnous the ‘rules governing the… nomination 
procedure and the Speaker’s functions’ are generally set out in the Rules of 
the House.62 As it stands, the Rules of the National Assembly of South Africa 
(“the Rules”) do not confine the roles, duties and powers of the Speaker to 
one particular Rule, so there are various provisions contained throughout the 
Rules that provide information pertaining to the functions and powers of the 
Speakership.63 In the near future there is a possibility that the Rules could be 
amended to include a specific Rule confining the duties and functions of a 
Speaker.64 
2.2 Election Procedure 
The Rules state that the Secretary or an officer of Parliament 
nominated by him, has the task of informing the NA that it must elect a 
Speaker and a Deputy Speaker.65 Directly following on from this the Chief 
Justice, or another judge designated to do so, must preside over the election 
process.66 The NA must elect a Speaker and a Deputy Speaker from 
amongst its members, at the first sitting of Parliament. 67 All Members are 
eligible for the position but a Member’s candidature must be supported by a 
                                                          
61 Section 52 of the Constitution. 
62 Bergougnous G “Presiding Officers of National Parliamentary Assemblies: A World 
Comparative Study” 1997 Inter-Parliamentary Union Geneva at page 5. 
63 Speakership refers to the Speaker of the NA, the Deputy Speaker of the NA and any 
presiding officer upon whom the Speaker or Deputy Speaker has delegated his or her 
authority to act as Chair of a sitting. 
64 Rules of the National Assembly. Progress Report on Review of Parliament Rules: report 
back by sub-committee, 4 February 2015. 
65 Rule 13(1) of the Rules of the National Assembly of South Africa, 8th Edition (the Rules). 
66 Section 52(2) of the Constitution.  
67 Rule 9 and section 52(1) of the Constitution. 
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minimum of two Members.68  If more than one person is nominated, a vote 
must be taken by secret ballot69, but should the Assembly nominate only one 
candidate, no formal election procedure is necessary, and said candidate is 
announced as Speaker of the NA. After expressing a sense of the honour 
conferred upon him or her, the newly-elected Speaker of the NA presides 
over the election of the Deputy Speaker by inviting Members to provide 
nominations for the position of the Deputy Speaker as per the process 
above.70 
The Speaker holds office for the duration of the term of an Assembly 
and is eligible for re-election upon the expiry of their first term. As is the case 
with most systems influenced by the Westminster model, the NA has the 
power to remove the Speaker through a resolution of no confidence. The 
resolution must be adopted by a majority of Members of the House for the 
motion to take effect. This is a Westminster custom which has been adopted 
by South Africa through a provision in the Constitution, which provides that: 
‘The National Assembly may remove the Speaker or Deputy Speaker 
from office by resolution. A majority of the members of the Assembly 
must be present when the resolution is adopted.’71 
Bergougnous notes that when the Speaker is removed from office by a 
motion of no confidence, the reasons for removal are usually based on the 
loss of political confidence in the Speaker, and the removal should not be 
viewed as a way of punishing the Speaker.72 
2.3 The Role of the Speaker 
Bergougnous explains that when one assesses the office of the 
Speaker, it is important to consider ‘not only the structural dimensions of the 
office but also the functions themselves.’73 In the paragraphs to follow, I will 
                                                          
68 Bergougnous G “Presiding Officers of National Parliamentary Assemblies: A World 
Comparative Study” 1997 Inter-Parliamentary Union Geneva at page 10. 
69 Schedule 3 Part A of the Constitution.  
70 Section 52(2) of the Constitution.  
71 Section 52(4) of the Constitution.  
72 Bergougnous G “Presiding Officers of National Parliamentary Assemblies: A World 
Comparative Study” 1997 Inter-Parliamentary Union Geneva at page 34.  
73 Bergougnous G “Presiding Officers of National Parliamentary Assemblies: A World 
Comparative Study” 1997 Inter-Parliamentary Union Geneva at page 3.  
18 
 
analyse the functions and powers of the Speaker of the NA as provided for 
by the Joint Rules of Parliament74 (“the Joint Rules”), the Rules of the NA75 
(“the Rules”), the NA Guide to Procedure76 (“the Guide”), and any other 
relevant source. 
The Guide states that the Speaker acts as the head of the legislative 
arm of government as well as the representative and spokesperson for the 
NA when dealing with the other branches of government, outside 
organisations and persons.77 Additionally, the Powers, Privileges and 
Immunities of Parliament and Provincial Legislatures Act78 (“the Act”) 
explains that the Speaker of the NA and the Chairperson of the NCOP 
exercise joint control and authority over the precincts on behalf of 
Parliament.79 The Constitution states that the Speaker will fulfil the role of 
acting President of South Africa when the President is absent from the 
Republic or when there is a vacancy in the office, and the Speaker will hold 
office until a new President is chosen from amongst the Members of the 
NA.80 
2.4 Functions of the Speaker 
The Speaker has the task of chairing meetings of the NA when it is 
sitting in plenary.81 The Speaker must commence the proceedings by making 
necessary formal announcements on the day’s activities as reflected on the 
Order Paper.82 During sittings the Speaker must ensure order is maintained 
in the House by calling upon Members to speak in accordance with lists of 
speakers provided by the Whips of each party. Any speech made by a 
Member during the course of a debate, or during a question and answer 
session, must be directed to the Speaker. In responding to a Member the 
Speaker is guided by the Rules, conventions, established practices and 
                                                          
74 Joint Rules of Parliament of South Africa, 5th Edition (the Joint Rules).  
75 Rules of the National Assembly of South Africa, 8th Edition (the Rules). 
76 National Assemblies Guide to Procedure 2004, Parliament of the Republic of South Africa. 
77 Ibid. at page 21. 
78 The Powers, Privileges and Immunities of Parliament and Provincial Legislatures Act 4 of 
2004 (the Act). 
79 Section 3 of the Act. 
80 Section 90 of the Constitution.  
81 National Assemblies Guide to Procedure 2004, Parliament of the Republic of South Africa 
page 18. 
82 Ibid. at page 19. 
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precedent which the office-holder must interpret objectively when framing a 
ruling.83  This practice obtains so that the Speaker is able to protect the rights 
and interests of each party present in the NA during sittings as well as to 
‘uphold the dignity and good name of the House.’84 Whilst presiding over a 
sitting, the Speaker or any presiding officer ‘has no deliberative vote, but 
must cast a deciding vote when there is an equal number of votes on both 
sides of the question.’85 Additionally, the Speaker is required to cast a vote 
on a matter when a question must be decided with a supporting vote of at 
least two-thirds of the Members.86  At the conclusion of the parliamentary 
working day, the Speaker has the authority to adjourn proceedings, or even 
suspend proceedings in certain circumstances. 
In addition to ensuring sittings run in an orderly fashion, the Speaker is 
the main communication channel between the House and any outside body 
or person. Any official communication originating from the NA is signed by 
the Speaker before it leaves the NA, and any communication intended for the 
House is addressed to the Speaker. Additionally, the Guide explains that the 
Speaker represents the NA on formal occasions.87 
2.4.1 The Speaker Chairs Various Committees 
The National Assembly consists of between 350 and 400 members 
whilst sitting in plenary and it may be difficult for meaningful debate to take 
place when all Members are present. Therefore, in order to ensure that 
Members are able to work more effectively and efficiently, smaller bodies or 
committees were created to fulfil specific functions. The Guide states that the 
Speaker ex officio chairs various internal Committees of the NA. These 
committees include: 
‘The Rules Committee; its Subcommittee on International Relations; 
the Programme Committee; and, with the Chairperson of the Council, 
he or she co-chairs the Joint Rules Committee and its Joint 
                                                          
83 Tlouamma and Others v Mbete, Speaker of the National Assembly of the Parliament of the 
Republic of South Africa and Another [2015] ZAWCHC at para 76. 
84 National Assemblies Guide to Procedure 2004, Parliament of the Republic of South Africa 
at page 18. 
85 Ibid. at page 21.  
86 Ibid. at page 21. 
87 Ibid. at page 21. 
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Subcommittee on International Relations and the Joint Programme 
Committee. He or she is an ex officio member of the Chief Whips’ 
Forum and of the Joint Tagging Mechanism.’88 
2.4.2 The Power to Delegate Authority 
If a Speaker is unable to attend a sitting, the Rules state that s/he may 
request the Deputy Speaker or a House Chairperson to preside over a sitting 
at any time.89 Additionally, if the Speaker is absent from Parliament, or if the 
office of the Speaker is vacant, the Rules state that the Deputy Speaker may 
assume the role of the Speaker, and if both the Speaker and the Deputy 
Speaker are absent from Parliament, the Speaker or Deputy Speaker, may 
delegate the role to a House Chairperson for the duration of their absence 
from Parliament.90 
2.4.3 The Power to Interpret or Create a Rule 
Whilst in session the Speaker must maintain order in the NA by 
interpreting and applying the Rules, parliamentary conventions, and 
precedent. The Speaker must respond to Members’ points of order by issuing 
rulings on matters where the rules are silent, or where there is no precedent 
on a particular matter. In so doing, the Speaker ensures that Members 
comply with the procedures, processes, customs, as well as any traditions of 
the institution. 
In a situation where the Rules are silent on a particular point, and 
there is no precedent on the matter, the Rules state that: 
‘(1) The Speaker may give a ruling or frame a Rule in respect of any 
eventuality for which these Rules do not provide. 
(2) A Rule framed by the Speaker shall remain in force until a meeting 
of the Rules Committee has decided thereon.’91 
If a dispute arises regarding a certain process or procedure, the Speaker is 
required to hear argument on the matter, and after hearing argument, the 
                                                          
88 Ibid. at page 22.  
89 Rule 15. 
90 Rule 16. 
91 Rule 2. 
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Speaker is required to give a ruling on the disputed point. The ruling remains 
in force until it has been considered by the rules committee. 
2.4.4 The Power to Discipline 
Given the often fraught and tumultuous nature of debate during 
sittings, there is always the dormant threat for Member misconduct to 
escalate throughout the House. Thus, a Speaker must ensure that order is 
maintained to allow for the NA ‘to fulfil its constitutional mandate to pass 
legislation in a manner that promotes a participatory and representative 
democracy, and to hold the executive to account.’92 Empowering provisions 
have been adopted which provide the Speaker with the authority to discipline 
Members in pursuit of maintaining the decorum. 
2.4.4.1 Disciplinary Powers Provided for by the Rules 
A Speaker may order a Member to withdraw from the House for the 
remainder of the day if: the Member’s conduct contravenes a provision of the 
Rules, s/he disregards the authority of the presiding officer, or if s/he acts 
with gross disorder.93 Additionally, the Speaker is empowered to suspend a 
Member who has committed a serious contravention, and when an order to 
withdraw is inadequate.94 If the presiding officer is not the Speaker, s/he 
must name a disorderly Member, and after consulting with the presiding 
officer, the Speaker may take any action deemed necessary against the 
Member.95 A Member who has been named will not be allowed to return to 
the precincts of Parliament, ‘Before the action taken against him or her by the 
Speaker has been announced.’96  If it is a Member’s first suspension, the 
suspension will last for five parliamentary working days. If it is a Member’s 
second suspension, the suspension will last for ten days, and if a Member is 
suspended for a third time, the suspension will last for 20 parliamentary 
working days.97 A suspended Member may write an expression of regret, and 
                                                          
92 Tlouamma and Others v Mbete, Speaker of the National Assembly of the Parliament of the 
Republic of South Africa and Another [2015] ZAWCHC at para 82. 
93 Rule 51. 
94 Rule 52 (a). 
95 Rule 52 (b). 
96 Rule 53(4).  
97 Rule 54. 
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if the Speaker approves the Member’s expression of regret, s/he may 
discharge the Member’s suspension.98 
2.4.4.2 Disciplinary Powers Provided for by the Act 
The Act empowers a Speaker to call upon personnel of the 
parliamentary security services to carry out his or her instructions in the 
precincts of Parliament.99 Additionally the Act allows a Speaker to order the 
arrest and removal of a person from the precincts of Parliament for disrupting 
a joint sitting of Parliament, a sitting of the House, or a sitting of a 
committee.100 
The meaning and constitutionality of section 11 of the Act was 
challenged by the Democratic Alliance (“DA”) in Democratic Alliance v 
Speaker of the National Assembly and Others101. The High Court held that 
section 11 is ‘constitutionally flawed’ because ‘a member may not be arrested 
under s 11 if the conduct that led to the arrest is protected under s 58(1) (b) 
and 71(1) (b) [of the Constitution].’102 The Court therefore declared section 11 
of the Act constitutionally invalid to the extent that it allows for a Member to 
be arrested for conduct protected by the section 58(1) (b) and 71 (1) (b) of 
the Constitution, and thus ordered Parliament to remedy the defect within 
twelve months.103 
The Court recognised the importance of protecting a Member’s right to 
freedom of expression in Parliament by explaining that freedom of expression 
is a core foundational principle of the institution, and a Member should not be 
forced to remain silent because s/he is fearful of removal as this is in direct 
contravention of this foundational principle. Whilst it is recognised that a 
Speaker must possess the power to discipline Members in order to ensure 
the efficient running of Parliament, the Speaker must not be empowered to 
order the arrest and removal of a Member for conduct that is protected by the 
Constitution. 
                                                          
98 Rule 55. 
99 Section 4 of the Act. 
100 Section 11 of the Act.  
101 Democratic Alliance v Speaker of the National Assembly and Others (2015) ZAWCHC 60. 
102 Le Grange J supra at para 47. 
103 Le Grange J supra at para 48. 
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2.5 The Duty to Act ‘Fairly and Impartially’ 
The Guide states that ‘the Speaker is required to act fairly and 
impartially to ensure that the rights of all parties, including minority parties, 
are protected.’104 In Lekota and Another v Speaker, National Assembly and 
Another105 Fourie J explained that although the Speaker is affiliated to a 
political party, the incumbent, ‘is required to perform the functions of that 
office fairly and impartially in the interests of the National Assembly and 
Parliament.’106 Furthermore, in Brummer, NO v Mvimbi and Others107 the 
Court explained that the Speaker’s functioning is regulated by the common 
law which demands that the Speaker be completely impartial and non-
partisan both inside the Chamber and outside the Chamber.108 
Laundy explains that a Speaker should work to ‘avoid an adversarial 
role’, and should attempt to carry out the role in a similar manner to that of a 
judge or an independent arbiter.109 Moreover, in Gauteng Provincial 
Legislature v Killian and Others110 Zulman JA held that a Speaker ‘is required 
by the duties of his office to exercise, and display, the impartiality of a 
judge.’111  Assuming that both Laundy and Zulman JA’s submissions are 
correct, one must look at policy regulating the duties of a judge as an aid in 
determining whether the two positions are indeed capable of comparison. 
The Code of Judicial Conduct112 (“the Code”), has been adopted in 
terms of the Judicial Service Commission Act113, and it provides an 
explanation as to what is expected of a judge in carrying out the role of a 
judicial officer. The Code states that a judge has the duty to: 
‘(a) uphold the independence and integrity of the judiciary and the 
authority of the courts; 
                                                          
104 Page 18 of the Guide.  
105 Lekota and Another v Speaker, National Assembly and Another 2012 ZAWCHC 385. 
106 Fourie J supra at para 11. 
107 Brummer, NO v Mvimbi and Others 13535/2011 [2011] ZAWCHC 385. 
108 Cloete JA supra at para 48. 
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(b) maintain an independence of mind in the performance of judicial 
duties; 
(c) take all reasonable steps to ensure that no person or organ of state 
interferes with the functioning of the courts; and 
(d) not ask for nor accept any special favour or dispensation from the 
executive or any interest group.’114 
The Code provides that a judge is duty bound to act honourably at all times 
and all the activities carried out by a particular judge, ‘must be compatible 
with the status of judicial office.’115 In National Director of Public Prosecutions 
v Zuma116 the SCA set out to provide an interpretation of the functions of a 
judicial officer. Harms DP explained that a judge should maintain a high level 
of independence when performing its functions.117  Moreover, Harms DP 
explained that a judge is entitled to have a personal opinion on an issue, 
however, judges may not introduce any personal thoughts or political beliefs 
into any of their judgments.118 
Upon evaluating the roles and functions of a judge, it is clear that there 
is merit in the statements made by Laundy and Zulman JA because the roles 
and functions of a judge, in terms of the law, are very similar to those of the 
Speaker. Like a judge, the Speaker is expected to uphold the independence 
and integrity of the institution, act fairly and impartially in the performance of 
its functions, take every reasonable step to ensure that no person or organ of 
State interferes with the functioning of the NA, and must not accept any 
special favour from the executive or any interest group, as this may impact 
negatively on the perceived independence of the institution. Thus, when one 
considers the tradition of impartiality adopted from the Westminster system, 
as well as the aforementioned law, it is clear that, whilst holding office, a 
Speaker must act fairly, impartially and must maintain his or her neutrality. 
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According to Bergougnous, a Speaker must exercise ‘a keen sense of 
conciliation while at the same time asserting his or her authority.’119 As such, 
a Speaker must strike a balance between his or her political affiliations and 
the duty owed to the NA. In so doing, an office holder must exercise the 
authority of the role with the utmost impartiality so as to retain the confidence 
of Members of the NA, including that of the minority parties.120 
It is thus clear that the Speaker exercises a vital function by ensuring 
the efficient functioning of the NA. Laundy states that the office of the 
Speaker is ‘the linch-pin of the whole chariot’ and it should be viewed as ‘one 
of the trustees of a nation’s liberties.’121 Without the office of the Speaker or a 
vacancy therein during parliamentary sittings, and therefore nobody serving 
Members’ rights, the South African NA would struggle to fulfil its legislative 
function and constitutional mandate. In conclusion, the NA and the office of 
the Speaker function symbiotically and the relationship between the two 
institutions is thus interdependent as well as mutually beneficial. Through 
applying the Rules and precedents of the institution impartially, the Speaker 
works toward advancing the development of the NA and strengthening the 
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Criticism of Aspects Relating to the Office of the Speaker in South 
Africa 
3.1 Introduction 
The past two years have proven to be highly eventful in the South 
African legislature. In 2015 a signal jammer was used to jam electronic 
devices during the President’s State of the Nation Address (“SONA”). That 
same evening, the House descended into chaos after Members of the 
Economic Freedom Fighters (“EFF”) were forcefully removed from the 
Chamber by armed security personnel for disrupting proceedings. This was 
followed by the Democratic Alliance (“DA”) walking out of the SONA 
proceedings after their leader alleged that the Speaker had acted ultra vires 
in allowing the South African Police Service to enter into the Chamber and 
remove Members of the EFF. In addition, Parliament has suffered many 
disruptions on other occasions as a result of Members disobeying the 
Speaker’s office and rulings. 
In 2014 a motion of no confidence was brought against the current 
Speaker, Baleka Mbete, by opposition parties who alleged that the Speaker 
was unable to act impartially and fairly as a result of her close affiliation to 
her political party (Mbete is the Chairperson of the African National Congress 
(“ANC”) National Executive Committee (“NEC”)). The motion against the 
Speaker was subsequently dismissed when the majority party asserted its 
voting dominance and overruled it. The quest to have the Speaker removed 
from office did not end with the dismissal of the motion, and in August 2015 
certain opposition parties brought an application in the Western Cape High 
Court for a declaration that the Speaker of the NA was not a fit and proper 
person to hold office as a result of her lack of impartiality.122 This lack of 
confidence in the Speaker is concerning because, as Laundy stated, she is 
‘the linch-pin of the whole chariot’ and it is important that she retains the 
confidence of all the parties in the NA. 
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Over the past two years the South African NA appears to have been 
weakened by, inter alia: a ruling party which, as it appears, is determined to 
maintain its current dominant status; a Speaker who has been accused of 
being partisan and unfair in performing the functions of the office; an 
opposition party which has used its presence in the NA to disrupt 
proceedings in an attempt to unsettle the majority party; and a clear division 
between the opposition parties. In this Chapter I will explore the potential 
influence of the dominant party on the office of the Speaker, as well as the 
alleged partisanship of the current office holder in performing the duties of 
the office.  By exploring the relationships between the above, conclusions will 
be drawn as to whether they have had an adverse effect on the office of the 
Speaker as well as the NA. 
3.2 The Impact of a Dominant Party on the Office of the Speaker 
The electoral system in South Africa is a multi-party system that 
‘results, in general, in proportional representation.’123 Ever since 1994 the 
ANC has managed to win power through elections that have been labelled 
free and fair by the Electoral Commission of South Africa (“IEC”). In 1994 the 
ANC won 62.6% of the vote which equated to 252 seats in the NA, in 1999 
the ANC won 66.4% of the vote thus capturing 266 seats in the NA. In 2004 
the ANC received 69.6% of the vote and in 2009 it received 65.9%. In 2014 
the ANC won 62.15% of the vote, thereby giving the party 249 seats in the 
NA – a clear majority. 
The abovementioned election results indicate that South Africa has 
emerged as a dominant party democracy as a result of, inter alia: the ruling 
party’s popularity amongst the electorate, and its attempts to centralise 
power.124 The ANC has attempted to centralise power by adopting the notion 
of cadre deployment as a bench mark principle operating within the 
organisation. Giliomee, Myburg and Schlemmer submit that South Africa’s list 
system has allowed the ANC to ‘place loyalists in key positions, and at the 
same time compensate those who have lost out in internal power struggles 
                                                          
123 Section 46 (1) (d) of the Constitution.  
124 Southall R “The Dominant Party Debate in South Africa” at page 70.  
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through redeployment to comfortable but less strategic posts.’125 Cadre 
deployment in itself, if carried out correctly in accordance with the true 
underlying principles that it was designed for, may be advantageous for 
government. Cadre deployment however becomes a matter of concern when 
a party loyalist who may not fit basic criteria, is placed in a position of 
authority that requires political neutrality and impartiality when carrying out 
the functions of the role effectively. 
It appears that the current dominant party often acts under the 
assumption that they will maintain the majority vote every five years. Based 
on this assumption it seems that they are acting without any regard for the 
will of the electorate and in a sense may be abusing the majority confidence 
shown in them. The assumption of the ruling party in this case is not 
unfounded because based on their previous experience the majority of the 
electorate will not turn against them. Due to this lack of accountability a 
dominant party could use its power to strengthen its political stronghold on 
the NA. The ANC as it seems has been able to maintain its tight grip on 
political power and pursue its political agenda by, inter alia: eroding the 
executive oversight function; implementing cadre deployment; and enforcing 
strict Member discipline. In the paragraphs to follow I will assess how each of 
these themes has impacted upon the office of the Speaker. 
3.2.1 Erosion of the Executive Oversight Function 
Democratic South Africa has seen four Members of the NA elected to the 
office of the Speaker, all of whom have maintained close political ties with the 
ANC by serving as Members of the ruling party’s NEC. This is not 
problematic provided an incumbent is able to distinguish between his or her 
party allegiances and the duty owed to Parliament.126 As previously stated, 
the current incumbent serves as the National Chairperson of the ANC NEC – 
a top official position in the organisation. 
The ANC NEC comprises 100 Members and of those 100 Members, there 
are six top official positions – the President, the Deputy President, the 
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National Chairperson, the Secretary General, the Deputy Secretary General, 
and the Treasurer General. As the President of South Africa, Jacob Zuma is 
the head of the national executive branch of government. President Zuma 
also serves as the President of the ANC NEC. Cyril Ramaphosa holds office 
as the Deputy President of the South Africa, and therefore forms a part of the 
national executive. In addition, Deputy President Ramaphosa serves as the 
Deputy President of the ANC NEC. Baleka Mbete serves as the National 
Chairperson of the ANC NEC and as the Speaker of the NA. 
During a parliamentary sitting on 6 August 2015, the Speaker shielded 
President Jacob Zuma from opposition scrutiny during a question and answer 
session. The President was asked a question by an opposition Member 
regarding the repayment of public funds used to improve security at the 
Nkandla residence. Members of the opposition felt that the President had 
answered the question inadequately, and instead of asking the President to 
respond adequately to the Member’s question, the Speaker stymied the 
scrutiny by explaining to the opposition that the President had given an 
answer, and although it was ‘an answer which you are not happy about, [it is] 
an answer nonetheless, that is what I am trying to prevail on you about [sic].’ 
Following on from this, the Speaker refused to recognise any additional 
points of order on the matter, and even went as far as ignoring a Member of 
the opposition whilst he was trying to raise an additional point of order on the 
matter. 
During that same sitting a Member of the opposition asked President 
Zuma a question regarding South Africa’s failure to sign a trade agreement, 
and whether South Africa would ever be a signatory to the agreement. The 
President answered the Member’s question by stating that this matter is a 
government issue and not an opposition issue. Furthermore, the President 
refused to answer the second part of the question. At this point another 
Member of the opposition asked the President to provide an adequate 
answer to the second part of the question relating to the trade agreement, 
and instead of asking the President to provide an answer, the Speaker 
interjected and ruled that the President had indeed provided an answer to the 
question and that the House must proceed on to the next question. 
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In Tlouamma and Others v Mbete, Speaker of the National Assembly of 
the Parliament of the Republic of South Africa and Another127 the Court 
explained that because the Speaker is a political appointee, ‘it is unavoidable 
that there will at times be tension as regards the Speaker’s continued role as 
NEC Chair due to the difficulties in keeping a balance between the dual and 
conflicting roles.’128 It could be deciphered from the above that the Speaker is 
having difficulties in striking a balance between her role as Speaker and her 
role as Chairperson of the ruling party. She is clearly portraying a high level 
of leniency and sympathy toward the executive. This is problematic because 
the legislature plays an important role in holding the executive accountable to 
the electorate for their actions. The Speaker has a duty ‘to perform the 
functions of the office fairly and impartially in the interests of the NA and 
Parliament,’129 and the above suggests that the office holder is attempting to 
avoid any political competition and thus political accountability. 
3.2.2 Strict Member Discipline 
The African National Congress Constitution130 (“ANC Constitution”) 
provides for 148 sub rules governing Member discipline – an indication of the 
ruling party’s commitment to ensure its Members toe the line, thus enabling 
the party to pursue its political mandate without opposition from within the 
organisation.  
According to the ANC Constitution a Member ‘must observe discipline, 
behave honestly and carry out loyally the decisions of the majority and 
decisions of higher bodies.’131 Further to this, the ANC Constitution explains 
that if the party structures have adopted a certain stance on a policy or 
resolution, Members must ‘familiarise themselves’ with the content of the 
adopted policy or resolution, and any Member who does not abide by the 
decision taken, ‘shall be liable to be disciplined.’ 132 
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The ANC Constitution makes provision for a list of ‘acts of 
misconduct’. It states that disciplinary proceedings may be invoked against a 
Member, if that Member is accused of, inter alia: 
‘25.17.3 Failing, refusing or neglecting to execute or comply with any 
ANC Policy, Standing Order, Rule, Regulation or Resolution adopted 
or made in terms of this Constitution or breaching the provisions of this 
Constitution; 
25.17.4 behaving in a manner or making any utterance which brings or 
could bring or has the potential to bring or as a consequence thereof 
brings the ANC into disrepute; 
25.17.11 undermining the respect for or impeding the functioning of 
any structure or committee of the ANC; 
25.17.12 joining or supporting a political organisation or party, other 
than an organisation in alliance with the ANC, in a manner contrary to 
the aims, objectives and policy of the ANC; 
25.17.19 in the case of a public representative, breaching his or her 
contract of deployment concluded with the NEC; 
25.17.20 in the case of a member of an ANC Caucus, failing, refusing 
or neglecting to carry out or execute an instruction or mandate of such 
caucus.’133 
In addition to the abovementioned clauses, the ANC Constitution contains a 
provision dealing with party Members who hold elective office in any sphere 
of government, as follows: 
‘ANC members who hold elective office in any sphere of governance 
at national, provincial or local level are required to be members of the 
appropriate caucus, to function within its rules and to abide by its 
decisions under the general provisions of this Constitution and the 
constitutional structures of the ANC.’134 
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Any Member or representative who is found guilty of any of the 
abovementioned acts of misconduct, or any Member who fails to abide by 
decisions taken by the ruling party, may be suspended or expelled 
indefinitely from the organisation.135 
The current Speaker is a Member of the ruling party who holds 
elective office in a national sphere of government, and therefore her conduct 
is governed by the ruling party’s Constitution. Strict discipline by the ruling 
party not only forces its Members to toe the line, but it forces other party 
representatives, including the Speaker, to do so out of fear of being 
suspended or expelled from the ANC. 
On 4 May 2014 the parliamentary Leader of the Democratic Alliance 
released a statement asking the then Speaker, Max Sisulu, to respond to 
reports that senior parliamentary officials had been summoned to appear 
before top ANC officials at the ruling party headquarters in Johannesburg. It 
was alleged by the DA that the parliamentary officials had been summoned 
to provide reasons as to why a parliamentary ad hoc committee had been 
established to assess the validity of submissions made by President Zuma to 
Parliament on the Nkandla matter.136  It is assumed that the non-
parliamentary wing of the ANC summoned Speaker Sisulu to its 
headquarters to enquire why an ad hoc committee had been set up without 
first seeking a decision from the structures of the ANC. 
The abovementioned event seems to suggest that the non-
parliamentary wing of the ANC is not afraid to summon any Member, 
regardless of office and the obligations therein, to its party headquarters 
should s/he make a decision that contradicts a decision taken by the 
structures of the ANC. The issue here is that the Speaker gains membership 
to the NA by way of nomination by his or her political party, and can be 
removed by the party which endorsed their nomination. The Constitution 
contains a provision stating that a person loses their membership of the NA 
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when they are no longer a Member of the party that nominated him or her.137 
Should a Speaker be found guilty of an offence and punished, s/he may be 
expelled from the organisation and therefore would be without a job and an 
income. For this reason I submit that the Speaker will be more inclined to 
serve the interests of his or her political party so as to avoid possible 
expulsion. 
3.2.3 Parliamentary Wing v Non-Parliamentary Wing 
According to Choudhry the ANC’s policy of cadre deployment has 
played a pivotal role in the achievement of democratic centralism in South 
Africa.138  The current debate is therefore centred on the relationship 
between the parliamentary wing and the non-parliamentary wing of the ruling 
party, and which of the two is the custodian of political power in South 
Africa.139 
Members of the ANC parliamentary wing represent the interests of the 
electorate in the NA and Members of the non-parliamentary wing hold office 
as a result of their political affiliations. In an attempt to assert its dominance 
on the political landscape in South Africa, the non-parliamentary wing of the 
ANC (the NEC) is responsible for deploying Members to the NA as well as 
other senior positions in various other institutions, with the aim of ensuring 
that the party’s policy directives are implemented correctly.140 A Member who 
has been deployed to a senior position is obligated to implement any policy 
directives taken by the NEC, and should a Member fail to do so, the NEC has 
the authority to redeploy a Member to another position, or even expel a 
Member from the party. 
As already mentioned, the current incumbent holds office as the 
Speaker of the NA, and in addition, she is the Chairperson of the ANC NEC. 
According to the ANC Constitution, the ANC NEC is the highest organ of the 
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organisation and it has the power to lead the organisation.141 Further to this, 
the ANC NEC has the power to, inter alia: 
‘Carry out decisions and instructions adopted at the National 
Conference, issue and send directives and instructions to the 
Provinces, supervise ANC organs and governmental caucuses, 
establish Departments and set up committees, institute disciplinary 
proceedings against any Member, conclude deployment contracts with 
public representatives, and recall any public representative.’142 
The ANC holds the majority of seats in South Africa’s NA, and 
therefore the Members of the party’s parliamentary wing are entitled to ask 
the majority of questions during sittings. Choudhry‘s observation however 
goes contrary to the above viewpoint in that the Members seldom do so, as 
they have been barred by strict party discipline.143 Should a Member of the 
ruling party’s parliamentary wing speak out against an adopted directive, or 
should s/he vote in a manner not reflected on the ANC directive papers, the 
Speaker may feel obligated to report the Member’s dissent to the ANC’s 
Chief Whip, who will report back to the ANC NEC. The Speaker may report a 
Member as it is his or her duty as a Member of the ANC NEC to supervise 
the ANC governmental caucus. Should the ANC NEC decide to take 
disciplinary action against a Member, the outcome could lead to 
redeployment to another area of government.  This could be an indication of 
how not to use cadre deployment advantageously. Apart from the 
embarrassment of being disciplined, relocating one’s life is highly expensive, 
time consuming, and is a disruption to one’s family life, all of which could be 





                                                          
141 Rule 12 of the ANC Constitution. 
142 Rule 12 of the ANC Constitution.  
143 Choudhry S “’He had a mandate’: The South African Constitutional Court and the African 
National Congress in a dominant party democracy” (2009) 2 Constitutional Court Review at 
page 11.   
35 
 
3.2.4 The Final Say… 
In Tlouamma and Others v Mbete, Speaker of the National Assembly 
of the Parliament of the Republic of South Africa and Another144 Goliath J 
held that ‘there is no legal basis to find that the Speaker cannot continue to 
hold the position of Chairperson of the National Executive Committee of the 
ANC as well as that of Speaker.’145 It is however submitted that there is 
indeed a legal basis for finding that the Speaker cannot hold the position of 
Chairperson of the NEC as well as that of Speaker. The basis for such a 
finding is that South Africa is a dominant party democracy.146 There is clearly 
no express Rule barring the Speaker from partaking in party politics and the 
ruling party has, as it would seem, been able to exploit this lacuna in its 
pursuit to maintain its dominant status by ‘shifting politics into the party and 
out of the legislature, diminishing the central role of the legislature in national 
political life.’147 
It could be argued that the ANC has attempted to maintain its 
dominant status in the NA by ensuring the successful placement of a senior 
party loyalist to the office of the Speaker, whose function it is to oversee 
parliamentary proceedings therein ensuring party Members follow the 
directives taken by senior leadership. The ruling party has managed to keep 
its parliamentary Members in check by subjecting them to strict party 
discipline. Furthermore the ANC has shown that it will not hesitate to 
summon an elected office holder to its party headquarters, if that person has 
made a decision which has not been sanctioned by the leaders of the 
organisation.  
In the next section I will evaluate the impartiality of the Speakership as 
it relates to both the maintenance of order in the NA and a Member’s 
freedom of expression. 
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3.3 Impartiality and Fairness 
The Guide explains that ‘the Speaker is required to act fairly and 
impartially to ensure that the rights of all parties, including minority parties, 
are protected.’148 However, in September 2014 the DA brought a motion of 
no confidence against the current office holder, Baleka Mbete, on grounds 
that she is unable to fulfil the role of Speaker in an impartial manner. The DA 
alleged that she ‘stands in the way of vigorous debate’ and her leadership 
role in the ANC ‘is the most important disqualifying factor.’149 According to 
Seedat it is not uncommon for a Speaker to be accused of political bias and 
such accusations tend to take place in legislatures all around the world.150 
In the sections to follow, I will assess controversies surrounding the 
office of the Speaker in South Africa in an attempt to ascertain whether there 
currently exists any evidence to suggest that the Speaker is acting unfairly 
and in a partisan manner in her role as head of the legislature. 
3.3.1 Limiting Members’ Freedom of Expression 
The right to freedom of expression has been included in the Bill of 
Rights of the Constitution.151 A Speaker, as the head of the legislative branch 
of government, has the duty to protect and safeguard every Member’s right of 
political expression during parliamentary sittings.152 Any speech made by a 
Member in the NA is protected by section 58 of the Constitution, Rule 44 of 
the Rules of the NA, and section 6 of the Act. The Constitution provides 
Members with special privileges and immunities in performance of their 
political roles and functions.153 It states further that Members of the NA, 
Cabinet Ministers and Deputy Ministers are entitled to freely express 
themselves in the National Assembly, as well as in their respective 
committees. Additionally, Members of the NA, Ministers and Deputy Ministers 
cannot be arrested, imprisoned or held liable for damages resulting from 
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anything that has been said or revealed during the course of a debate taking 
place in the NA.154 Currie and de Waal explain that this is an ‘absolute right 
to freedom of speech.’155 
A Member’s absolute right to freedom of expression has however 
been under assault by the Speakership in that Members have been forcibly 
removed from the NA for making an expression. On 9 September 2015 a 
Member of the EFF refused to withdraw statements he had made about 
Deputy President Ramaphosa when asked to do so by the presiding officer. 
As a result of his refusal to withdraw his statements, the presiding officer 
ordered parliamentary ‘bouncers’ to forcibly remove the Member of the 
opposition from the House. Furthermore it is important to note that the 
Member’s refusal to withdraw the statements did not grossly disrupt the order 
of the House. 
A few years earlier a Member of the NA was suspended from the 
House for making statements about other Members of Parliament during the 
course of a debate. An ad hoc committee was formed, by the majority of the 
House, to deal with the matter, and made a recommendation for the Member 
to be suspended from the House for 15 days. Moreover, the Member was 
told to issue a written apology to the Assembly and the Members whom she 
had named during the debate. The Speaker then adopted the committee’s 
recommendations and suspended the Member from the NA for the 
recommended period of time. The Member then decided to challenge the 
resolutions of the House in court by arguing that the majority of the Members 
of the committee were biased against her and were therefore acting mala 
fide. Additionally, the Member argued that she did not receive a fair hearing 
before the recommendations were adopted.156 
The Court in Speaker of the National Assembly v Patricia De Lille157 
agreed with the Member’s submissions, and declared that the resolution 
taken by the NA was invalid.158 On appeal, the SCA explained that it needed 
                                                          
154 Section 58(1) (b) of the Constitution.  
155 Currie & De Waal “The New Constitutional and Administrative Law” 2001 page 352. 
156 Speaker of the National Assembly v Patricia De Lille [1999] ZASCA 50 at para 10. 
157 Speaker of the National Assembly v Patricia De Lille [1999] ZASCA 50. 
158 Mohamed CJ supra at para 11.  
38 
 
to enquire as to whether the NA had the authority to punish or discipline a 
Member for making a statement which in no way disrupted proceedings.159 
The Court looked to the Constitution as an aid in determining the 
aforementioned question, and thus it explained that although the Constitution 
allows for Parliament to formulate rules that temporarily exclude disruptive 
Members from sittings of Parliament. Suspending a Member for non-
disruptive comments made during a debate obstructs a Member’s 
constitutionally protected right to freedom of expression in the NA.160 The 
court held that the NA did not have any constitutional authority to suspend a 
Member from the NA for making comments during the course of a debate. 
For a Member to be suspended, the comments must have disrupted the 
proceedings of the House.161 
On 26 June 2015 the rules committee adopted an interim arrangement 
to deal with ongoing disruptions in the NA. A majority of the parties in the 
rules committee agreed that it needed to address the issue of disruptions 
because they were beginning to obstruct the NA from carrying out its 
functions.162 For the most part I agree with the committee on the adoption of 
interim measures to deal with disruptions, however, I do not agree with the 
presiding officer’s decision to invoke the interim Rule against the Member of 
the EFF on 9 September 2015. The rules committee created the interim 
arrangement to deal with disruptions of the House during sittings, however, 
the EFF Member’s statement was firstly, not grossly disruptive of the 
proceedings of the House, and secondly, the presiding officer asked the 
Member to withdraw his statement only once the House had completed the 
business of the day. 
Therefore I would argue that the decision of the presiding officer to 
remove the Member from the Chamber, despite it having no adverse 
consequences on the day’s proceedings, is out of kilter with the ruling of the 
SCA in the De Lille matter. The SCA explained that the NA could not 
discipline a Member for statements made which did not disrupt proceedings 
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because as Mahomed CJ explained,  to do so would be an infringement upon 
a Member’s constitutionally protected right to freedom of expression in the 
NA.163 Therefore, when taking into account the committee’s reasons for 
implementing the interim arrangement, as well as the decision in the De Lille 
matter, it is apparent that the presiding officer erred in ordering that a 
Member be forcibly removed from the Chamber for expressing a view. 
Whilst it is recognised that the power of the Speaker to order the 
withdrawal of a Member is essential to maintaining order in the House, the 
Guide states that this power should ‘be used sparingly.’164 The presiding 
officer seems to have been hasty in her decision to invoke the interim Rule 
against the opposition Member. Her action suggests that she was attempting 
to use the interim Rule as a way of ‘muzzling’ a Member of the opposition. 
This is a matter of concern because a Member has an absolute right to 
freedom of expression in the NA. Therefore no presiding officer should 
attempt to silence any Member of the NA, unless that Member is guilty of 
grossly disrupting the proceedings of the House. 
3.3.2 House Descending into Chaos as a Result of the Speaker’s 
Actions 
Over the past year the Speaker has struggled to maintain order in the 
NA and on numerous occasions the House has descended into chaos - at 
times as a direct result of the Speaker’s own actions. 
On 18 June 2015, during a sitting of the House, an opposition Member 
of Parliament raised a point of order in response to a question directed at 
President Zuma by a fellow opposition Member. The Speaker chose to ignore 
the point of order brought by the opposition Member, but instead recognised 
a point of order by the Chief Whip of the majority party. A few moments later, 
the Speaker chose to recognise another Member’s point of order (at this 
juncture she still had not recognised the initial point of order raised by the 
opposition Member). The Member of the opposition party, who raised the 
initial point of order, then proceeded to ask the Speaker to recognise his 
point of order. Furthermore, to address him as ‘an equal Member of this 
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House [sic].’ This caused the House to descend into chaos which bore a 
striking resemblance to a battle ground rather than a place of reputable 
political exchange. The Speaker responded to the chaos by suspending 
proceedings for an hour whilst she met with the Whips in the secretary’s 
office. 
Moreover, when proceedings resumed, a Member of the opposition 
party raised a point of order and whilst doing so, a Member of the ruling party 
shouted across the House that he is ‘talking nonsense.’ When the opposition 
Member asked the Speaker to intervene, by asking the Member of the ruling 
party to withdraw the statement, the Speaker replied that she had not heard 
the comment, and therefore she refused to ask the Member to withdraw the 
statement. The Speaker’s refusal led to further disruptions, and in an attempt 
to rescue the situation from descending into chaos, the Chair eventually 
asked the Member of the ruling party whether she had indeed directed the 
statement toward the Member of the opposition. To which the Member of the 
ruling party replied ‘yes I did, I withdraw’. At this point Members’ tempers 
were flaring because the opposition felt that the Speaker was acting in a 
biased way by not naming the Member of the ruling party for her unruly 
behaviour. At this point, Members of the EFF had lost all interest in 
proceedings and proceeded to chant ‘Pay back the money! Pay back the 
money!’ The Speaker had no choice but to prematurely adjourn proceedings 
for the day. It could be suggested that had the Speaker recognised the 
Member’s initial point of order, a breakdown in the decorum may have been 
avoided and the NA could have continued with the order of the day. 
3.3.3 Speaker Making Disparaging Remarks about Opposition Parties 
These incidents seem to suggest that the Speaker and presiding 
officers have had difficulty in performing the functions of the office in a fair 
and impartial manner. It could be suggested that the Speaker has attempted 
to use her role in office to undermine the image of the opposition parties in 
the NA. 
In Tloulama the applicants criticised the current office holder for 
making ‘disparaging remarks’ about the EFF outside of the NA. The Speaker 
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later withdrew one of the remarks and apologised to the EFF by issuing a 
media statement.165 It is however submitted that the Speaker should not be 
making vexatious comments about political parties who are present in the 
NA. Although her apology was admirable, her actions have portrayed 
negatively upon the office as well as the NA. A Speaker must work to 
maintain the confidence of all the parties in the NA and in making disparaging 
remarks about opposition parties inside or outside the precincts of 
Parliament, does not instil this confidence. This lack of confidence could lead 
Members to no longer have trust in the Speaker. The chaos seen in 
Parliament reflects this lack in confidence of the Members toward the 
Speaker. 
3.4 Rules Surrounding the Speakership 
3.4.1 Introduction 
As was previously stated, the Rules do not contain a specific provision 
for the roles, duties and functions of the office of the Speaker and the Deputy 
Speaker. There are however various provisions contained in the Rules which 
provide for the functions and powers of the Speakership. In this section I will 
assess a proposed Draft Rule relating to the general responsibilities of the 
Speaker; discuss a Rule regarding motions of no confidence in the President; 
and analyse a proposed draft Rule empowering a presiding officer to order 
the forcible removal of a Member from the Chamber. 
3.4.2 Draft Rule 17A 
On 4 February 2015 a Report166 (the Report) was concluded by the 
subcommittee on review of the Assembly Rules. The purpose of the Report 
was to propose possible amendments to Chapters one through nine of the 
Rules. The Report by the subcommittee to the rules committee states that it 
is necessary for the NA to continuously reassess its procedures and 
parliamentary practices therein ensuring that the South African legislature 
continues to carry out its institutional obligations.167 The Report includes a 
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proposed amendment to the Rules in the form of a Rule setting out the 
functions and powers of the office of the Speaker. 
The proposed draft Rule reads as follows: 
‘17 A General authority and responsibility of Speaker 
(1) In exercising the authority of the Speaker, as provided for in [the] 
Constitution and legislation and Rules of Parliament, the Speaker 
must: 
(a) ensure that the National Assembly provides a national forum for 
public consideration of issues, by passing legislation and by 
scrutinizing and overseeing executive action in accordance with 
section 42(3) of the Constitution; 
(b) ensure that all parties represented in the National Assembly 
participate effectively and efficiently in the proceedings of the 
Assembly and it’s committees and forums and facilitate public 
involvement in the processes of Parliament in accordance with 
sections 57 and 59 of the Constitution; 
(c) observe and promote compliance with the principles of co-
operative governance and intergovernmental relations in accordance 
with Chapter 3 of the Constitution; and 
(d) whenever possible, consult with relevant office-bearers and 
structures within Parliament to achieve the efficient and effective 
functioning of Parliament in a transparent and accountable manner. 
(3) the Speaker shall maintain and preserve the order of and the 
proper decorum in the House, and uphold the dignity and good name 
of the House. 
(4) the Speaker is responsible for the strict observance of the Rules of 




(5) the Speaker shall act fairly and impartially and ensure that the 
rights of all parties are protected.’168 
Rule 17A is clearly an attempt by the Rules Committee to clarify the 
authority and responsibilities of the Speaker in the South African NA. 
However, the list of responsibilities specified in 17(A) (1) appears to be 
closed. This could be a potential problem in the future because of the 
logistical burden placed on the committee each time it decides to amend the 
Rules by inserting a further responsibility. Any amendment process is costly 
and a waste of parliamentary time and resources. Therefore, it would be 
more favourable for Rule 17A to include a ‘catch-all’ provision for the 
eventuality that a new obligation is created. An example of a possible ‘catch-
all’ type of provision is as follows: 
‘When exercising any power or performing any function, the Speaker, 
Deputy Speaker, or any presiding officer, must at all times comply with 
the spirit and purport of the Constitution of the Republic of South 
Africa.’ 
I would argue that a ‘catch-all’ provision, such as the above, is necessary as 
it reaffirms the point that all Members of government must ensure their 
conduct is in accordance with the ethos of the Constitution. 
Whatever, it is submitted that the proposed Rule is a step in a positive 
direction as it codifies a number of universally acceptable duties that are 
associated with the office of the Speaker. Furthermore, the proposed Rule 
provides clarity on what is expected of a person when exercising the powers 
of office. 
3.4.3 Draft Rule 53A 
The rules committee of the NA has been considering an amendment 
to the Rules to address continuous disruptions taking place within the 
Chamber. Draft Rule 53A allows for the Speaker, or presiding officer to call 
upon the parliamentary protection services to remove a Member from the 
precincts of Parliament, if a Member is ordered to withdraw from the 
Chamber because s/he commits a serious disturbance, and subsequently 
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s/he refuses to adhere to the order of the Speaker.169 Additionally, the draft 
Rule provides that whenever a Member is removed from the House, the 
Speaker must refer the circumstances of the removal to a multi-party 
committee for consideration.170 
The rules committee met on 16 September 2015 to consider the 
powers and functions of the new multi-party committee. It was agreed by all 
the Members of the rules committee that a new committee should be formed. 
However, there was a disagreement between Members of the ruling party 
and opposition Members ‘on the ability of the new committee to examine and 
review the original ruling of the presiding officer which gave rise to the 
removal of the Member in question.’171 The ANC stated that the new 
committee should not be able to review the rulings of the presiding officer. An 
ANC Member argued that rulings by the Speaker or a presiding officer could 
not be reviewed as this did not happen in Parliament. The opposition parties 
held a different viewpoint on the matter, they argued that the committee 
should be able to review the original ruling by the presiding officer. They held 
that Draft Rule 53A (12) makes provision for the consideration of the 
circumstances leading up to the Member’s removal, and if the committee was 
not able to review the original ruling, the Member who was removed would 
have to refer the matter to the courts to review the decision. 
The view of the opposition parties seems more consistent with the 
general framework of impartiality within which the Speaker ought to operate. 
Therefore, I would argue that the multi-party committee should be granted 
the power to review an original decision taken by the presiding officer in order 
to ensure that Rule 53A does not get abused during sittings. It is important 
for a committee to be able to review the original decision so as to hold a 
Speaker accountable for his or her actions, thereby deterring a Speaker from 
invoking the Rule as an attempt to silence opposition Member’s during 
sittings. The power to remove a Member from the House is an extremely 
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effective mechanism and, therefore, it is vital for a Member to be able to 
review a decision in respect of procedural fairness. 
Although I agree with the opposition on the point of holding the 
Speaker accountable for his or her actions, I do not support the proposed 
Rule in its entirety for a number of reasons.  Firstly, the Rule allows for the 
Speaker to order the removal of Members from the NA. These Members 
have been democratically elected to represent the interests of a portion of the 
electorate, and should a Member therefore be removed from a sitting, that 
Member would miss out on any remaining business of the day. Furthermore, 
the interests of his or her supporters would not be represented in any further 
deliberations - this is at odds with deliberative democracy.  Secondly, the 
Rule has room to be abused by the Speaker or the presiding officer in that it 
may be invoked to silence a Member of the opposition. Already we have 
witnessed it being incorrectly invoked by a presiding officer against a 
Member of the opposition. The Rule is qualified by disruptive behaviour of a 
Member, however, recently a Member was ordered to be forcibly removed for 
refusing to withdraw statements that in no way disrupted the proceedings of 
the NA. 
3.4.4 Rule 102A 
As previously mentioned, under South Africa’s constitutional 
democracy, the legislature acts as an oversight mechanism on the executive. 
The Cabinet is answerable to the legislature, and therefore serves as an 
important check on the executive. The Constitution grants the legislature the 
power to remove the President and/or his Cabinet, by adopting a motion of 
no confidence.172 This mechanism of control over the executive stems from 
the fact that the executive is not elected by the voters, and therefore, it 
should not be afforded the opportunity to exercise its power without the 
support of the directly elected NA.173 The right, as contained in the 
Constitution, is not only restricted to minority parties. Members of the ruling 
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party also have the right to bring a notice of motion against the President 
and/or the Cabinet.174 
In Mazibuko v Sisulu and Another175 the Constitutional Court dealt with 
a constitutional challenge to the Rules of the NA because they failed to 
provide for an adequate procedure relating to motions of no confidence as 
envisaged by section 102 of the Constitution.176 Prior to the hearing of this 
matter, the Court requested the Speaker to file a report on the progress of 
‘ensuring that motions of no confidence [in the President and the Cabinet] are 
appropriately provided for in the Rules.’177 Moseneke DCJ, writing for the 
majority, concluded that Chapter twelve of the Rules was inconsistent with 
section 102 (2) of the Constitution. Therefore, they were invalid as they failed 
to sufficiently provide for a procedure that allows for a Member to bring a 
motion of no confidence against the President and the Cabinet.178 
Additionally, Moseneke DCJ stated that the declaration of constitutional 
invalidity was to be suspended for six months, therein providing the NA with 
an opportunity to correct the defect.179 
Post Mazibuko, the Rules of the NA have been amended to include a 
procedure regarding motions of no confidence in terms of section 102 of the 
Constitution. Section 102A of the Rules states the following: 
 ‘102A. Motions of no confidence in terms of section 102 of the 
Constitution: 
(1) A member may propose that a motion of no confidence in the 
Cabinet or the President in terms of section 102 be placed on 
the Order Paper. 
(2) The Speaker must accord such motion of no confidence due 
priority and before scheduling it must consult with the Leader of 
the Government Business and the Chief Whip of the Majority 
Party. 
                                                          
174 Section 102 of the Constitution. 
175 Mazibuko v Sisulu and Another 2013 (6) SA 249 (CC). 
176 Moseneke DCJ supra at para 38.  
177 Moseneke DCJ supra at para 68. 
178 Moseneke DCJ supra at para 82.  
179 Moseneke DCJ supra at para 82.  
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(3) The motion must comply, to the satisfaction of the Speaker, 
with the prescripts of any relevant law or any relevant rules and 
orders of the House and directives and guidelines 
recommended by the Rules Committee and approved by the 
House, before being placed on the Order Paper, and must 
include the grounds on which the proposed vote of no 
confidence is based. 
(4) The Speaker may request an amendment of or in any other 
manner deal with a notice of no confidence motion which 
contravenes the law, rules and orders of the House or 
directives and guidelines approved by the House. 
(5) After proper consultation and once the Speaker is satisfied that 
the motion of no confidence complies with the aforementioned 
prescribed law, rules, orders, directives or guidelines of the 
House, the Speaker must ensure that the motion of no 
confidence is scheduled, debated and voted on within a 
reasonable period of time given the programme of the 
Assembly. 
(6) The debate on a motion of no confidence may not exceed the 
time allocated for it by the Speaker, after aforesaid consultation 
process. 
(7) If a motion of no confidence cannot reasonably be scheduled 
by the last sitting day of an annual session, it must be 
scheduled for consideration as soon as possible in the next 
annual session. 
(8) Rules 95, 97 and 101 do not apply to motions of no confidence 
in terms of this Rule.’180 
The Speaker of the NA exercises a discretionary authority over the 
motion of no confidence process, in that he or she has the authority to decide 
whether a motion of no confidence in the President is debated in the NA. The 
Rule provides that the Speaker may only schedule a motion once the Leader 
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of the Government Business and the Chief Whip of the Majority Party have 
been consulted.181 The Rule provides further that, ‘the motion must comply, 
to the satisfaction of the Speaker… before being placed on the order 
paper...’182 The Rule continues to allow the Speaker discretion when deciding 
whether a motion will be scheduled for debate. It states further that a motion 
of no confidence may be scheduled only ‘once the Speaker is satisfied’ that 
the motion complies with any relevant formalities. Further to this the Rule 
gives the Speaker the discretion to set a time limit for the debate on a motion 
of no confidence.183 
Amended Rule 102A places a great deal of power within the ambit of 
the Speaker regarding motions of no confidence in the President. Assuming 
that an incumbent was aiming to ingratiate him- or herself with the bosses of 
his or her political party, s/he may bar the motion from being debated in the 
NA, by arguing that it does not comply with his or her satisfaction. 
Furthermore, if a Speaker decided not to block the motion, he or she still has 
the power to decide the amount of time allocated toward the motion for 
debate in the NA. Therefore, if a Speaker does not support a motion brought 
against the President, s/he has the power to stymie the debate by allocating 
an unreasonably short amount of time for debating the motion. 
The Constitution bestows upon all parties of the NA the right to bring a 
motion of no confidence against the President and/or the Cabinet. Given the 
language of Rule 102A, it is argued that the Rule is at odds with the 
Constitution because it allows the Speaker to decide whether the motion 
should be scheduled or not. As South African history has dictated, a Speaker 
will always belong to the majority party in the NA, and therefore the majority 
party will always have a substantial amount of authority in deciding whether 
the motion should be scheduled or not. In South Africa’s democratic political 
climate it makes no sense for the Speaker to wield the discretion in deciding 
whether the motion should be scheduled and debated in the NA because of 
our Speakers close allegiances to their political party. It could be argued that 
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the Rule needs to be re-examined in that it places less influence within the 




























Proposed Solutions to Remedy the Problems in South Africa: Lessons 
from Abroad 
4.1 Introduction 
When considering ways to strengthen and improve the office of the 
Speaker in South Africa, the first port of call is to usually suggest that the 
Speaker must cut ties with the political party to which s/he is affiliated- as is 
the case in the House of Commons in the United Kingdom. I am however not 
convinced that this is the only way of improving and strengthening the office 
of the Speaker. The office is capable of being improved and strengthened by 
creating and implementing new standing rules, amending existing procedures 
and through the development of new customs. As was previously mentioned, 
the office of the Speaker and the NA function in symbiosis. Therefore, it is 
submitted that should the office be enhanced and strengthened it would have 
a positive effect on the development of the NA in toto. This Chapter will set 
out to identify the different standing rules, processes and procedures which 
have been implemented by foreign legislatures in an attempt to strengthen 
and improve the Speaker’s office. This Chapter will then discuss the foreign 
measures and attempt to draw conclusions as to whether it would be 
favourable for the NA to adopt a similar process in pursuit of enhancing the 
office. 
4.2 A Compromised Solution 
In an article on the impartiality of the Speaker, De Vos asks two 
important questions: should the Speaker of the NA be completely impartial 
and should the Speaker be obligated to resign as a Member of his or her 
political party upon being appointed to the office.184 These are two relevant 
questions to be cognisant of when assessing the status quo of the 
Speakership in South Africa. 
                                                          





In the South African context one cannot expect a Speaker to resign 
from his or her political party, as is the case in the House of Commons, 
because the South African electoral system is based on a closed list 
proportional representation system.  This essentially means that the political 
party owns the Speaker’s seat in the NA. The Speaker therefore needs to 
remain a Member of a party in the NA in order to retain his or her 
membership of Parliament. The Constitution allows for a Member to defect 
from his or her political party and join another party in the NA, however, given 
the current political climate in South Africa it seems highly unlikely that a 
Member belonging to the ruling party would defect to one of the smaller 
opposition parties.  It is further suggested that it would be unfair to require a 
Speaker to quit his or her political party. One needs to remember that the 
Speaker is a politician who has dedicated many valuable years to the pursuit 
of climbing the political ladder in his or her respective party. It would thus be 
unreasonable and somewhat selfish to expect a candidate to undo all their 
hard work simply because of their appointment as Speaker. 
Therefore, the next proposal is somewhat of a compromise. It is 
suggested that Members of the NA who are top-ranking party leaders must 
be excluded from being nominated by other Members of the House during 
the selection process. For practical purposes, the Chief Justice could release 
a form to all Members of the NA (prior to their first meeting of the NA) stating 
the names of Members who have been excluded from the selection process 
(i.e. senior party leaders and Cabinet Ministers). The Rules of the NA would 
be the appropriate forum for such a standing rule as above, which regulates 
a process regarding said exclusions. 
In the Canadian House of Commons a Speaker-elect is not expected 
to resign as a Member of his or her political party. However, Members of the 
House who are Ministers or party leaders do not qualify for the election as 
Speaker. The Standing Orders of the Canadian House of Commons185 state 
that ‘no Minister of the Crown, nor party leader, shall be eligible for election to 
                                                          




the Office of the Speaker.’186  Laundy explains that in the early stages of the 
Canadian Speakership, ‘the government regarded the Speaker as one of 
their own and little was done to boost his authority or encourage practices 
which would assist him in gaining the confidence of the opposition.’187 The 
aforementioned standing order seems to indicate that the Canadian House of 
Commons recognised that there was a need to enhance the independence of 
the office in order to achieve cross-party support for the Speaker in the 
House. One identifiable way of achieving cross-party support, as well as 
improving the independence of the Speakership, is to ensure that a senior 
party leader is not capable of being appointed to the office - thereby 
potentially negating any long term political affiliation toward that particular 
party.  
In response to the second question posed by De Vos, it is suggested 
that a Member should not be obliged to resign from their political party upon 
appointment as Speaker, provided that senior party leaders must be 
excluded from running for office. 
4.3 Making the Speaker Immune to the ‘Anti-defection’ Clause 
Under South Africa’s closed list proportional representation electoral 
system it is difficult for a Speaker to refrain from acting in a partisan manner 
as s/he is nominated to the NA by his or her political party. The Speaker thus 
remains a Member of his or her political party even when holding office. If a 
Speaker resigns or is expelled from the party that nominated him or her to 
the NA, s/he will no longer be a Member of the Assembly, and therefore s/he 
will no longer hold office as Speaker. As was previously argued, what this 
may suggest is that a Speaker could be more inclined to show bias toward 
his or her political party out of fear of being disciplined and possibly removed 
from the NA for not toeing the party line. 
It has been argued that the anti-defection clause is undemocratic 
because it stymies freedom of speech as well as freedom of association.188 
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However in the First Certification189 judgment, the Constitutional Court 
explained that the anti-defection clause is consistent with the Constitutional 
Principles because it ‘obliges members of a party, who are elected by virtue 
of the inclusion of their names on the party’s list, to remain loyal to that 
party.’190 I do not reject the reasoning of the Court vis-à-vis an ordinary 
Member of Parliament. I do however disagree with the Court’s reasoning 
when considering the Speaker. The Guide indicates that although the 
Speaker is affiliated to a political party, s/he ‘is required to perform the 
functions of that office fairly and impartially in the interests of the Assembly 
and Parliament.’191 The Guide has thus clearly placed an obligation on an 
incumbent to perform the functions of the office in a manner which furthers 
the interests of the NA and Parliament. It is however difficult to imagine how 
a Speaker would be able to protect the rights and interests of all parties when 
s/he is susceptible to strict party discipline. 
In 1985 India’s Constitution192 was amended so as to provide for an 
‘anti-defection’ clause. The clause states that a Member of Parliament or a 
Member of the State Legislature would be disqualified on grounds of 
defection should they resign from their political party, or if they voted in 
contravention of a directive issued by senior party leaders.193 Interestingly the 
Indian Constitution contains a provision that exempts the Speaker and the 
Deputy Speaker of the House of the People (“Lok Sabha”) from being 
disqualified on the ground of defection.194 Thus a Speaker or Deputy Speaker 
may sever ties with their political party, and in so doing they will not be 
disqualified from the Lok Sabha and will maintain their position as office 
holder. 
It is submitted that the Constitution and the Rules of the NA must be 
amended so as to include a provision which makes the Speaker immune to 
the ‘anti-defection’ clause, as is the case in India. The proposed amendment 
could be similar to the provision contained in the Indian Constitution, 
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however, the South African provision must include a sub-provision that 
exempts a Member who has been expelled from the political party who 
nominated him or her to the NA barring certain exceptions such as expulsion 
for corrupt activity or gross insubordination. Therefore, it is suggested that 
the provision should reflect as follows: 
‘A person elected to the office of the Speaker, or Deputy Speaker of 
the National Assembly, shall not lose membership in the NA – 
(a) If s/he is expelled from the party that nominated him or her as a 
Member of the National Assembly except in instances of corrupt 
activity and/ or gross insubordination; or 
(b) If s/he resigns from the party that nominated him or her as a 
Member of the National Assembly’ 
It is therefore argued that the independence of the Speaker’s office will 
be strengthened by amending the Constitution and the Rules with reflection 
on the above proposed amendment. It is further submitted that the office 
holder will no longer have to fear removal for not following the directives of 
senior party leaders thus leading to greater impartiality. Moreover, immunity 
from the ‘anti-defection’ clause may assist in improving relations between the 
Speaker and the opposition parties, as the Speaker would be able to promote 
the interests of all the parties during debates and question and answer 
sessions without his or her actions being perceived to support rival political 
parties. Finally, the amendment may assist in protecting a Speaker from 
accusations of bias brought by opposition Members. This is a negative 
political tactic adopted by opposition parties to disrupt proceedings of the 
Assembly, and by strengthening the independence of the office, opposition 
Members may resist the urge to accuse a Speaker on such a ground. 
4.4 Speaker Election Procedure 
The election procedure pertaining to the Speaker and Deputy Speaker 
of the NA is not contained in the Rules of the NA but rather the 
Constitution.195 The election procedure as set out in the Constitution has 
provided the NA with a satisfactory foundational process. The use of a secret 
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ballot system is commendable as it reflects a modern democratic election 
process. However, it is suggested that the NA must establish a committee to 
review and possibly amend certain aspects regarding the current election 
procedure in order to strengthen the independence of the office. 
A procedure committee exists in the House of Commons in the United 
Kingdom and its task is to oversee parliamentary reform debates. Between 
the years 2000 and 2001 the committee reviewed the election process 
pertaining to the Speaker in the House of Commons. The committee 
reviewed the process by, inter alia creating a questionnaire for Members to 
answer; hearing oral evidence from parliamentarians and analysing methods 
utilised by other legislatures.196 It is therefore submitted that there is a need 
for the South African NA to instruct the rules committee to review the current 
election procedure by making use of similar processes as that of the 
procedure committee in the House of Commons. In the paragraphs to follow I 
will analyse methods used by foreign legislature’s vis-à-vis the Speaker 
selection process. In so doing I will analyse procedural reforms that may 
improve and strengthen the office of the Speaker. 
4.3.1 Add an Election Procedure to the Rules of the NA 
First and foremost, the election procedure as provided for by the 
Constitution must be included in the Rules of the National Assembly. It is not 
uncommon for standing rules to contain an election procedure pertaining to 
the presiding officers. Both the Standing Orders of the House of Commons197 
in the United Kingdom and the Standing Orders of the House of Commons198 
in Canada contain comprehensive election procedures vis-à-vis the Speaker 
and Deputy Speaker. 
As it stands, if the NA wanted to amend the voting procedure 
pertaining to the Speaker, the Constitution dictates that any amendment to 
Schedule three would need to be adopted in terms of the process as 
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provided for in the text of the Constitution.199 The process is extremely 
intricate and relies heavily on a high threshold of votes in order to pass an 
amendment to an item contained in the Constitution. It is therefore submitted 
that it would be more favourable for the procedure to be contained in the 
Rules of the NA for the following reasons. Firstly, the procedure set out for 
amending a procedure contained in the Rules of the NA is less stringent than 
the process provided for in the Constitution. It would be less burdensome for 
the NA to carry out amendments to its own procedures as opposed to 
procedures provided for in the Constitution. All that is simply required is a 
vote in favour by the majority of Members of the rules committee in order to 
adopt a proposed amendment.200 Secondly, the Constitution provides that 
the NA may determine its own procedures and make its own rules pertaining 
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to its business.201  However, amending a procedure as contained in the 
Constitution is reliant on a number of conditions being met – one of which 
being the President assenting to the proposed amendment. Therefore, as it 
stands the NA is not able to determine its own procedures as an amendment 
to the Speaker’s election procedure is reliant on approval by the President of 
the Republic. 
4.3.2 Amend the Current Nomination Procedure 
According to the current election procedure, a candidate must be 
nominated by two Members of the NA to qualify as a candidate to run for 
election to the office of the Speaker.202 In an attempt to strengthen the office 
by way of amending a procedural aspect, it is submitted that the nomination 
procedure must be amended to require that a person’s candidature must be 
supported by at least 15 Members of the NA, five of whom must belong to 
political parties other than the candidate’s own party. This proposed process 
could assist in ensuring that the Speaker-elect has the support from a range 
of parties in the NA and not just the party to which s/he is politically aligned. 
A similar process has been adopted by the House of Commons in the 
United Kingdom. The Standing Orders of the House of Commons203 state 
that a candidate must be nominated by no fewer than twelve Members and 
no more than 15 Members, of which three of those Members must be elected 
to the House as Members of other political parties.204 In a committee 
publication of the House of Commons procedure committee it was explained 
that it was favourable for a candidate to receive sponsorship from three 
Members belonging to other political parties, ‘in order to demonstrate cross-
party support.’205 Furthermore, it was argued that a candidate must receive 
sponsorship from 15 Members in order to run for election to office.206 
It is pertinent for a Speaker-elect to have cross-party support in the NA 
as it is his or her job to maintain order amongst all the Members whilst the 
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House is in sitting. It is vital that all parties display a sense of confidence in 
an office holder so that s/he is able to carry out the functions of the office in 
an effective manner and allowing less room for disruption. Based on the 
evidence of Chapter Three it is suggested that the current incumbent does 
not enjoy cross-party support, and this has led to a situation whereby the NA 
has on many an occasion been unable to carry out its legislative duties, due 
to it descending into chaos as a result of Members not respecting the current 
office holder. Furthermore, it seems as though the opposition parties are not 
supportive of the current Speaker’s dual role as office holder and party 
Chairperson. These objections are of particular importance when one 
considers South Africa’s current political climate and especially when 
considering the dominant party argument as set out in Chapter Three. 
It is therefore argued that all Members of the NA must be given an 
equal opportunity to express whether or not they support the nomination of a 
certain candidate. Thus, the current nomination procedure must be amended 
so as to allow for a wider range of Members to approve the nomination of a 
particular Member. The amended process may achieve respect for the 
Speaker-elect from all parties within the NA. Bach explains that if Members of 
an assembly do not have mutual respect for each other, ‘their assembly is 
doomed to failure.’207 Thus by adopting a nomination process such as the 
aforementioned, Armitage believes that ‘it is entirely conceivable that, in the 
future, an MP who is popular and respected across the House will be 
persuaded to stand and be carried into the chair on a tidal wave of cross-
party support’ which may be in further support of Bach’s explanation.208 This 
outcome would be most favourable in South Africa especially when 
considering the lack of cross-party support for the current office holder. 
4.5 Speaker and Deputy Speaker 
Armitage explains that the House of Commons in the United Kingdom 
is of the opinion that ‘the principle of Speaker impartiality is protected by 
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ensuring that one party does not monopolize the office.’209 Thus in order to 
maintain a political equilibrium, the House of Commons elects one Deputy 
Speaker (First Deputy Chairman) from the Speaker’s side of the House and 
two Deputy Speakers (the Chairman of Ways and Means and the Second 
Deputy Chairman) from the opposition.210 Upon further investigation it was 
established that Greece has also set out to achieve multi-partisan 
representation vis-à-vis the Speakership.  In the Hellenic Parliament there 
are seven Deputy Speakers who assist the Speaker in carrying out the 
functions and duties of the office. The Standing Orders of the Hellenic 
Parliament dictate that the first three Deputy Speakers must belong to the 
governing party. The fourth Deputy Speaker must belong to the main 
opposition party, the fifth Deputy Speaker must belong to the second biggest 
opposition party, the sixth Deputy Speaker to the third biggest opposition 
party and the seventh Deputy Speaker must belong to the fourth largest 
opposition party.211 
South Africa’s Constitution and the Rules of the NA state that at the 
first sitting of the NA, Members must elect one of its Members as Speaker 
and another Member as Deputy Speaker.212 Additionally, the Rules of the NA 
state that the House must elect three of its Members as House Chairpersons 
(House Chairperson: Committees; House Chairperson: International 
Relations; House Chairperson: Internal Arrangements).213 It is argued that 
the aforementioned provisions must be reviewed and possibly amended so 
as to include an item stating that if a Speaker-elect is a Member of the 
majority party, candidates for the position of the Deputy Speaker must be 
drawn from a pool of opposition Members. In other words if the Speaker is a 
Member of the ruling party, the Deputy Speaker must be a Member of an 
opposition party. The amendment could also provide for a situation in the 
reverse, thus if the Speaker-elect is a Member of an opposition party the 
Deputy Speaker must be a Member of the majority party. Furthermore in 
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order to achieve a comprehensive party balance of the Speakership, it is 
suggested that the Rules of the NA must be amended to provide that the first 
Chairperson must belong to the majority party in the NA, the second 
Chairperson must belong to the largest opposition party, and the third 
Chairperson must be a Member of the second largest opposition party. 
The Constitution explains that South Africa is founded upon, inter alia, 
‘a multi-party system of democratic government.’214 Sadly little has been 
done to achieve an equal party balance of representatives in the office of the 
Speaker. In recent times the DA has entrenched itself as the ‘official 
opposition’ in the NA, however, to date the party has never had a Member 
become a presiding officer. In 2014 a candidate belonging to the DA (Nosimo 
Balindlela) was nominated to run for election as Speaker, however, she was 
defeated by the ANC’s candidate (Baleka Mbete) who received 260 votes out 
of a possible 400. Since 1994 the office of the Speaker has and continues to 
be dominated by Members belonging to the ANC. Choudhry explains that 
‘one of the pathologies of a dominant party democracy is the colonisation of 
independent institutions meant to check the exercise of political power by the 
dominant party, enmeshing them in webs of patronage.’215 Although the 
Constitution does not consider the office of the Speaker to be an independent 
institution, it is clear that the ANC has managed to colonise the office to the 
extent that no other political party has had the opportunity to have a Member 
serve as an office holder. The Constitution states that the NA must scrutinize 
and oversee executive action, hence it is crucial for the office of the Speaker 
to consist of Members from a host of different parties as opposed to only the 
majority party. It is therefore suggested that the Rules of the NA must be 
amended in order to facilitate the achievement of a system of multi-party 
representation, and to strengthen and improve the legitimacy, accountability 
and independence of the Speaker’s office. 
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4.6 Remove Speaker from Motion of No Confidence Proceedings 
The Constitution bestows upon all parties of the NA the right to bring a 
motion of no confidence against the President and/or the Cabinet. Given the 
language of Rule 102A, it is argued that the Rule is at odds with the 
Constitution as it allows the Speaker to decide whether the motion should be 
scheduled or not. Furthermore, the Speaker has the authority to allocate an 
amount of time for a motion to be debated.  As South African history dictates, 
a Speaker will always belong to the majority party in the NA, and therefore 
the majority party will always have a substantial amount of authority in 
deciding whether the motion should be scheduled or not. In South Africa’s 
current political climate it makes no sense for the Speaker to wield such 
discretion in deciding whether the motion should be scheduled and debated 
in the NA, due to our Speakers close allegiances to their political party. It 
could therefore be argued that the Rule needs to be re-examined so as to 
place less influence within the ambit of the Speaker. 
In Canada the process relating to motions of no confidence in the 
Prime Minister and the Cabinet is not included in any statute or Standing 
Order of the House. According to Beauchesne ‘the determination of the issue 
of confidence in the government is not a question of procedure or order and 
does not involve the interpretive responsibilities of the Speaker ... matters of 
confidence should at all times be clearly subject to political determination.’216 
Therefore, the Speaker has no discretionary role in deciding whether the 
motion can be debated in the House. The Speaker may only rule as to 
whether everything is in order and whether the vote has been adopted by the 
majority of Members or not.217 
Griffith and Ryle explain that if a Member of the opposition in the 
United Kingdom’s House of Commons brings a motion of no confidence in 
‘Her Majesty’s Government’, the government must provide time for the 
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motion to be debated.218 Furthermore, there are no formal rules regulating 
the motion of no confidence process, however, the debate of a motion of no 
confidence will generally precede the normal business of the day.219 
According to Erskine, it is an established convention that the government 
agrees to allow for a day to discuss the motion brought by the opposition.220 
The aforementioned indicates that the Speaker exercises no authority during 
motion of no confidence proceedings. 
It is submitted that the South African procedure vis-à-vis motions of no 
confidence needs to be reviewed and amended so as to remove the 
Speaker’s discretion from the process. The reliance on the Speaker’s 
discretion has opened the office up to an array of harsh criticism, admittedly, 
sometimes it is unnecessary and unjustified.  Therefore in order to strengthen 
the independence and legitimacy of the office, it is suggested that the 
Speaker should not have any authoritative responsibilities during motion of 
no confidence proceedings. As is the case in Canada, the Speaker is only 
expected to make a ruling as to whether any basic formalities have been 
discharged by the opposition party bringing the motion, and whether the 
House has indeed adopted the motion or not. Furthermore South Africa’s NA 
needs to establish a system, by way of amending the Rules, which obligates 
the government to provide the NA with a day to discuss the opposition’s 
motion of no confidence – and as is the case in the United Kingdom as seen 
above. 
Alternatively, the Speaker’s discretion should be removed from Rule 
102A in toto. A possible solution may be to substitute the role of the Speaker 
with that of the Public Protector during the no confidence process. Therefore 
in the event of a motion of no confidence being brought against the 
government, the Public Protector would have the discretion to decide 
whether the motion complies with any formalities. Furthermore, the Public 
Protector could consult with the relevant actors on the matter and could make 
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a decision as to the time allocation for debating the motion in Parliament. The 
only role the Speaker would then play in the process is pronouncing whether 
the vote has indeed been adopted by the NA or not.  It is argued that the 
discretion of an impartial third party would assist in enhancing the legitimacy 
of the motion of no confidence process, and furthermore it would strengthen 
the independence of the office of the Speaker as a result of protecting an 
office holder from unnecessary abuse in the event that the motion does not 
























 Concluding Remarks - The Importance of Having a Strong Legislature 
This paper has attempted to trace the evolution of the office of the 
Speaker in Westminster by assessing certain traditions, customs and 
standing orders that have developed over a period of time. Following on from 
this, I attempted to highlight certain flaws and various issues existing in the 
South African system.  This paper proceeded to analyse several foreign 
Parliamentary procedures and standing rules in an attempt to identify 
possible ways to strengthen the independence of the South African office in 
pursuance of gaining the confidence of the NA toward the Speaker. Whilst 
conducting research it became apparent that territories such as the United 
Kingdom, Canada as well as India have admittedly been successful in their 
attempts to protect and advance their legislatures as a result of enhancing 
the authority of their respective Speaker’s offices. The evidence seems to 
indicate that the political stability in each of these countries seems to have 
resulted in, inter alia strong functioning economies and an electorate who has 
responded positively to democracy by turning out in large numbers come 
voting day. The status quo in South Africa unfortunately does not bear the 
same resemblance to the previously mentioned states. The country is 
experiencing political instability, an economy on the verge of being 
downgraded to junk status and an electorate who would rather abstain from 
voting during general elections. 
It is therefore necessary for the South African legislature to develop 
and enhance the effectiveness and capacity of the NA. Given the increased 
frequency of questionable or poor decision-making by Members of the 
executive, one would have expected the NA to seize the opportunity to rise 
above the executive and flex its oversight muscle. As it stands however it 
seems as though Parliament’s oversight function is declining rather than 
expanding, which has allowed the executive to get away with illogical 
decision-making as well as corrupt activity. It is therefore argued that certain 
measures need to be implemented to enhance the effectiveness of the NA’s 
oversight function so as to achieve a higher level of political accountability 
which could potentially result in greater political stability. As this paper has 
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argued, one possible way of achieving stability in the NA would be to 
strengthen and enhance the independence of the office of the Speaker. By 
achieving a greater level of political stability, it is argued that South Africa’s 
economy would be provided with more of a stable foundation to grow on a 
macroeconomic as well as a microeconomic level. In a paper prepared by 
Aisen and Jose Veiga for the International Monetary Fund, it was established 
that countries with greater political instability tended to be associated with a 
lower GDP growth rate per capita.221 This study seems to suggest that 
politics seems to influence the economy – this is evident in South Africa. 
President Jacob Zuma recently fired the Country’s Finance Minister which led 
to a situation whereby the Rand plummeted against most major currencies. It 
is thus important for state actors to continuously debate and formulate ways 
to strengthen the capacity of each branch of government so as to maintain 
stable economic growth. 
When assessing the above-mentioned submissions, it is necessary for 
one to bear in mind that the South African government has a constitutional 
obligation to take reasonable measures to provide every citizen with a basic 
education, as well as to ensure that each person has access to adequate 
housing. Furthermore according to Statistics South Africa’s General 
Household Survey222, 44.5% of households in South Africa benefit from 
government social grants in some way.223  With an enormous dependency on 
government, one would expect for them to do everything reasonably possible 
to enhance and develop our democratic institutions so as to achieve political 
stability and by extension economic growth. However, little has been done on 
this front, which has resulted in a stagnant economy and a massive wealth 
gap between the people of South Africa. 
It was established in this paper that the rules of the NA are clearly 
insufficient as they do not provide adequate measures of strengthening and 
enhancing the independence of the office of the Speaker – a key 
parliamentary office. It is submitted that the Courts are not the appropriate 
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engine to effect change to the office of the Speaker.  The Constitution 
contains a provision stating that the NA has the power to determine its own 
‘internal arrangements, proceedings and procedures.’224 The text states 
further that the NA has the authority to formulate its own rules and orders 
concerning its business.225 It is therefore unlikely that the South African 
Courts would display a willingness to overstep the mark by intervening in the 
internal arrangements of the NA. It is recognised that the Constitution gives 
the courts the power to make any order that is just and equitable.226 
However, the courts should try to avoid dictating to the NA which procedures 
and processes it must develop and implement. To do so would be 
encroaching on the function of another branch of government and the court’s 
decision may lead to adverse consequences due to the polycentric nature of 
the decision. 
In Bato Star Fishing (Pty) Ltd v The Minister of Environmental Affairs and 
Others227 O’Regan J explained concisely that: 
‘In treating the decisions of administrative agencies with the appropriate 
respect, a court is recognising the proper role of the executive within the 
Constitution.  In doing so a court should be careful not to attribute to itself 
superior wisdom in relation to matters entrusted to other branches of 
government.  A court should thus give due weight to findings of fact and 
policy decisions made by those with special expertise and experience in 
the field.’228 
It is after all the NA which is in the best position to decide which processes 
and procedures would be best suited in strengthening and enhancing certain 
offices and committees within the NA. 
It is therefore argued that the NA must develop and implement 
measures to strengthen itself in any way possible in order to restore some 
stability and credibility to South Africa’s legislative branch of government. It 
                                                          
224 Section 57(1)(a) of the Constitution. 
225 Section 57(1)(b) of the Constitution.  
226 Section 172 (1)(b) of the Constitution.  
227 Bato Star Fishing (Pty) Ltd v The Minister of Environmental Affairs and Others 2004 (4) 
SA 490 (CC).  
228 O’Regan J supra at para 48. 
67 
 
would therefore be desirable for the rules committee to assemble a 
subcommittee, in terms of section 45(1) (c) of the Constitution, to debate on 
ways to strengthen and enhance the capacity of the office of the Speaker as 
well as the NA. The subcommittee must be given a mandate to conduct an 
investigation into possible amendments to the Rules of the NA and ways in 
which to assist the Speaker to gain the confidence of the National Assembly. 
It is vital for the national legislature to be afforded the opportunity to 
carry out its duties in a timeous and unrestricted manner. The tales of 2015 
have proven that South Africa’s NA is currently in disarray and is thus in dire 
need of reformatory processes and procedures so as to strengthen and 
develop the capacity of an important branch of government. This paper has 
sought to expose certain issues that have hindered the development of South 
Africa’s NA and certain solutions have been proposed with the intention of 
initiating a debate surrounding the different ways in which to strengthen the 
national legislature. It is with hope that the rules committee will take these 
proposals into consideration and recognise the need to reform aspects of the 
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